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1. INTRODUCTION 
A pernicious force is stalking the American economic landscape. 
Individuals owning valuable properties have watched their value de-
crease by 30 to 40% with the stroke of a pen. This wholesale and 
wanton destruction of value has not created consternation, however. 
Indeed, it is often the result of careful planning for which the owners 
of the devalued property pay large fees to appraisers and lawyers. A 
common tool of estate planning involves the purposeful diminution in 
value of family property in order to reduce estate and gift taxes. 
This Article considers a basic strategy that involves dividing up con-
trol of an asset such as a business or real estate. Division of control 
reduces the value of the assets because it impairs the ability of the 
donees to direct the use of the assets to more profitable pursuits. Be-
cause donees will incur transactional costs in negotiating among them-
selves before implementing any new activity with respect to the asset, 
this strategy frequently results in the reduction in the value of the 
transferred property by up to 40%. 
This technique presents a major mystery. The maximum statutory 
tax rate applied to gifts or estates is 60%.1 Although a donor may 
save transfer taxes by reducing the value of the transferred property, 
the tax savings will not equal the donee's economic harm if the dimi-
nution in value is reaP For example, a reduction by $100 in the value 
of real estate transferred upon the taxpayer's death will reduce estate 
1 IRe § 2001(c). Although § 2001(c)(I) refers to a maximum rate of 55%, § 2001(c)(2) 
increases the rate to 60% for amounts that exceed $10 million but are less than $21.04 
million in order to phase out the benefits of the graduated tax rate and the unified credit. 
2 Joseph M. Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value-Lines, 43 
Tax L. Rev. 241,254 n.54 (1988) [hereinafter Redoing] ("Of course, in many of these cases, 
the economic loss attributable to the creation of minority interests is probably illusory, or 
else the transaction would not have been undertaken in the first place.") 
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tax by up to $60, but the legatee will receive property that is worth 
$100 less. In most situations, a rational taxpayer would not engage in 
such a transaction. Thus, it is unlikely that the taxpayer has destroyed 
value by $100. Instead, the high marginal tax rate on estates and gifts 
makes it economically feasible on an after-tax basis for a donor to 
destroy some value so long as the remaining residual value has been 
transformed into something that will escape taxation. The estate plan-
ning devices transform a portion of the value formerly associated with 
control into an option or opportunity for the donees to recreate the 
"value" attributable to control. So long as this option or opportunity 
escapes estate, gift and income taxation and has a value greater than 
any after-tax value in the asset that has been permanently destroyed, 
the donor and donee will benefit. 
For example, consider a parent who transfers a family business to 
two children, giving each child an equal right to control the business. 
The sum of the values of the children's interests in the business is less 
than the value that the business had when owned entirely by the par-
ent. This reduction in value reflects the fact that neither child can 
implement her plans for the business unilaterally. Thus, if one child 
wishes to sell the business but the other does not, the former will not 
maximize profit from the sale because a third party buyer will have to 
negotiate control with the latter. If the value of the business is dis-
counted by $100, the donor saves $60 in gift tax because the gift tax 
applies to the value of the property transferred to each donee. Note 
that if this diminution in value is irreparable, the children have lost 
$100. Suppose, however, that they can restore $100 of value by incur-
ring $10 of transaction costs to negotiate an agreement to sell the busi-
ness together to a third party. If they do so, they will enjoy a net 
increase of $90 in value, while the donor will save $60 in gift tax. So 
long as the children incur transaction costs of less than $60 to restore 
the $100 value, there will be a net benefit to the family.3 
This phenomenon results from a fundamental discontinuity be-
tween the estate tax and the gift taxes.4 Although the gift tax is in-
3 The analysis in the text assumes no taxable capital gain upon the children'S sale of the 
business. In fact, if the parent had a low tax basis in the business, the children would have 
taxable capital gain because they would receive the asset with a carryover basis under 
§ 1015(a). If the children could have avoided the capital gains tax by receiving the asset at 
the parent's death and obtaining a stepped-up basis under § 1014(a), the tax payable in the 
inter vivos gift context is an additional cost that should be factored into the anal}'Sis. 
Therefore, so long as the children can avoid incurring transaction costs and capital gains 
tax expenses of $60 in restoring the $100 value, there will be a net benefit to the family. 
4 2 Treasury Dep't, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 386-87 
(1984) [hereinafter Treasury J]; Mary L. Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Oose Cor-
porations for Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing 
Wealth Syndrome, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 895, 922 (1978). 
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tended to serve as a backstop to prevent circumvention of the estate 
tax,s the definition of the tax base for gift tax purposes differs signifi-
cantly from the tax base for estate tax purposes.6 The gift tax base is 
the value of each gift measured using a purely hypothetical transferee 
and not considering the personal characteristics of the actual trans-
feror or transferee.7 The estate tax base is the value of all property 
held by the decedent at the time of death regardless of whether the 
property will be divided among legatees, again using a hypothetical 
third party standard. 
None of the five proposals offered by academics, policymakers and 
the House of Representatives to address this discontinuity has been 
adopted.8 One reason for the absence of legislative response may be 
an incomplete analysis of the concept of including the transfer of an 
opportunity in the gift tax base or, alternatively, of excluding a control 
premium in the estate tax base where none of the legatees receives 
control. There also may be a sentiment that the Service currently has 
sufficient tools to deal with egregious abuses of the discontinuity. Fi-
nally, there may be some concern about the constitutionality of sub-
jecting the control premium to a gift tax if the control premium in fact 
is destroyed.9 
Section II briefly reviews the dichotomy between the estate and gift 
taxes. Section III explores how closely held corporations, real estate 
and partnerships have been valued. Section IV describes valuation 
methods currently used by taxpayers and the courts to create minority 
discounts. The analysis shows that the method currently used by the 
courts to value minority interests is biased in favor of low valuations. 
Section V analyzes legislative and judicial responses to these tax re-
duction strategies. In Section VI, I analyze tools available to the Ser-
vice to try to capture some of the lost value. It shows that the notion 
5 See H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 
457,477; S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 
496,525; John G. Steinkamp, Common Sense and the Gift Tax Annual Exclusion, 72 Neb. 
L. Rev. 106, 110-12 (1993). 
6 See Treasury I, note 4, at 388. 
7 See text accompanying notes 30-31. 
8 See H.R. Rep. No. 495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 995, reprinted in 1987-3 C.B. 193, 275; 
Treasury I, note 4, at 386-88; Dodge, Redoing, note 2, at 254-56; Alan L. Feld, The Implica-
tions of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 934, 945-46 (1974); Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 924-25. 
9 Richard L. Dees, Now That the Monster Is Dead, Can You Avoid the Hot Seat? The 
Cold Facts of Partnership Freezes Under Chapter 14, 71 Taxes 902, 906 n.44 (1993) [herein-
after Monster]; see also S. Stacy Eastland, The Legacy of I.R.C. Section 2036(c): Saving 
the Closely Held Business After Congress Made "Enterprise" a Dirty Word, 24 Real Prop. 
Prob. & 'fro J. 259, 328-30 (1989) [hereinafter Legacy] (discussing potential unconstitution-
ality of § 2036(c) prior to its repeal); Jeffrey N. Pennell, Recent Wealth 'fransfer Thx Devel-
opments in Major Tax Planning, § 1515.4B, lnst. on Fed. Tax'n (1991) (discussing potential 
unconstitutionality of § 2704). 
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of "swing vote" value that recently has been employed by the Service 
to add value to minority shares of stock is a game theory concept that 
actualy may result in lower valuations, not higher valuations, when 
applied in the context of current regulations. The Article also shows 
tha~ the substance-over-form and step transaction doctrines are only 
applicable in the most egregious situations and easily can be avoided 
with careful planning. Section VII analyzes whether the current dis-
continuity makes sense from the perspective of efficiency and equity. 
The Article concludes that it does not and that the opportunity to par-
ticipate in control should be included in the gift tax, as well as estate 
tax, base when the transferor and family members control an asset or 
business both before and after the transfer. This approach is not with-
out precedent. It is similar to the existing treatment of certain other 
transfers by chapter 14 in very narrow circumstances. In Section VIII, 
I determine that such an inclusion in the gift tax base would be consti-
tutional regardless of whether the opportunity actually is transferred. 
Section IX is a brief conclusion. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION 
The estate tax is imposed on the value of the decedent's gross es-
tate10 less certain deductions.u The gross estate includes, in general, 
property owned by the decedent at death as well as property over 
which she exercised substantial control.12 The estate tax, therefore, is 
assessed upon all interests that the decedent possessed at death re-
gardless of whether these interests will be divided among heirs or leg-
atees. An asset in which a decedent owns a controlling interest thus is 
valued for estate tax purposes with the control premium. 
In contrast, the gift tax is imposed upon the value of the property 
transferred by the donor to each donee.13 This discontinuity allows a 
person owning a controlling interest in an asset to avoid paying a 
transfer tax on the control premium by making inter vivos gifts of the 
asset. For example, suppose a donor holding 60 shares of common 
stock in a closely held corporation that has 100 shares of issued and 
outstanding stock is able to sell all 60 shares to a third party for $1,000 
10 The gross estate is defined in §§ 2031·2046. 
11 The deductions are described in §§ 2053·2056. 
12 The property includable in a decedent's gross estate because she exercised significant 
control is described in §§ 2035-2039 and 2041. See generally 5 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence 
Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts cbs. 126, 128 (2d ed. 1993). 
13 Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 
127 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (D. Conn. 1954); Phipps v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 1010, 1022 
(1941), aff'd, 127 F.2d 214 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1942); T.A.M. 9449001 
(Mar. 11, 1994); see also Reg. § 25.2512-2(e) (discussing valuation of each gift). 
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per share. The donor probably would be able to sell one share of 
stock to a third party for a substantially lesser amount, say $700 per 
share,14 because the share of stock, by itself, would not provide con-
trol of the corporation.15 One method to reduce the gift tax is to di-
vide the shares among several donees so that no donee would have 
control,16 The value of each gift would not reflect a control pre-
mium,17 Indeed, the donor need not give all her stock away during 
her lifetime. So long as she reduces her percentage ownership below 
50%, she can reduce the value of stock for estate tax purposes that she 
retains as well as stock that she gives away. In the prior example, if 
she gave away 11 shares, she would reduce her ownership to 49%, 
eliminating a control premium for gift and estate tax purposes.1S 
Another method to reduce the value of gifts involves dividing up an 
asset but retaining control of the asset. This is accomplished by mak-
ing gifts of interests in a partnership, into which valuable assets have 
been placed.19 For example, suppose that the donor owns valuable 
rental property. Rather than give individual interests in the real es-
14 One study that analyzed publicly announced mergers and acquisitions for the period 
1968 to 1987 found that purchasers of controlling interests paid, on average, a premium of 
approximately 37 to 38% over the market price in order to obtain a controlling interest. 
Robert P. Lyons & Michael J. Wilczynski, Discounting Intrinsic Value, 128 'fro & Est. 22. 
22-24 (1989). In other words, the study found that minority interests in corporations trade 
on public exchanges on average at a discount of approximately 27 to 28% of the intrinsic 
value of the corporation. Id. It is important to note, however, that because the study 
involved publicly announced acquisitions, the premium may result from the ineptitude of 
the incumbent management in those acquired companies, rather than representing a uni-
versal measure of value of control. For an interesting critique of control premiums, see 
Thomas D. Hall, Comment, Valuing Closely Held Stock: Control Premiums and Minority 
Discounts, 31 Emory L.J. 139 (1982); see also Lance S. Hall, Valuation of Fractional Inter-
ests: A Business Appraiser's Perspective, 57 Appraisal J. 173 (1989), for a discussion of the 
importance of calculating the minority discount in light of the facts associated with the 
specific company. Not surprisingly, this latter article finds that the minority discount is 
larger for poorly managed companies than well managed companies. Id. at 176. 
15 See Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 78, 106 (1986) ("The minority discount is recog-
nized because the holder of a minority interest lacks control over corporate policy, cannot 
direct the payment of dividends, and cannot compel a liquidation of corporate assets."). 
16 George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax 
Avoidance, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 161, 195-204 (1977); Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 896-900. 
17 See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 75-1 USTC 'lI13,076 (E.D.N.C. 1975); Whittemore, 
127 F. Supp. 710; Estate of Piper v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1062 (1979); Estate of Lenheim 
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (1990); Estate of Heppenstall v. Commissioner, 8 
T.C.M. (CCH) 136 (1949); see also Driver v. United States, 76-2 USTC 'l! 13,155, at 85,700 
(W.D. Wis. 1976) (involving owner of 100% of stock who gave 84% to eight people; court 
applied neither minority discount nor control premium.) 
18 See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); First Nat'l 
Bank of Fort Smith v. United States, 610 F. Supp. 933 (W.D. Ark. 1985); Estate of Jung v. 
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 412 (1993); Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193 
(1990). 
19 See Neil McBryde, The Esoterica of Family Partnerships in Major Tax Planning 
'I 1000 (1993). 
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tate to his children and, as a result, lose control of the real estate, the 
donor can form a limited partnership to hold the real estate and give 
limited partnership interests to his children. The donor, or frequently, 
the donor's wholly owned corporation is the general partner, enabling 
the donor to continue to control the real estate. Because the limited 
partners lack control, a minority discount is permitted in valuing the 
limited partnership interests.20 A cottage industry has sprung up using 
this strategy.21 
It may seem peculiar that such a simple strategy of making inter 
vivos gifts of minority interests effectively would circumvent the con-
trol premium that would be payable by an estate. One might wonder, 
for example, whether the fact that the donees are all in the same fam-
ily or close friends means that the control premium has actually disap-
peared. As discussed below, the current definition of "value" for 
purposes of the gift tax precludes consideration of the relationship of 
the donees to one another and to the other owners.22 
The dichotomy between the estate and gift tax is not limited to mi-
nority discounts.23 The estate tax's focus on what the decedent owned 
at the time of death in contrast to what is actually transferred to spe-
cific legatees creates other anomalous tax results. For example, in 
Ahmanson Foundation v. United States,24 the decedent owned all the 
voting and nonvoting stock of a corporation. He bequeathed the vot-
20 See, e.g., Harwood v. Commissioner, 82 T.e. 239, 268 (1984), aff'd, 786 Fold 1174 (9th 
Cir) (permitting 50% discount for lack of control and marketability), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
1007 (1986); Bischoff v. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 32, 49 (1977) (allowing 15% minority dis-
count); Knott v. Commissioner, 55 T.e.M. (CCH) 424, 431-32 (1988) (permitting 30% dis-
count for lack of control and marketability). 
21 See, e.g., Martin D. Begleiter, Estate Planning in the Nineties: Friday the Thirteenth 
Chapter 14: Jason Goes to Washington (pt. I), 81 Ky. U. 535 (1992-1993); Robert B. 
Coplan & David H. Gerson, Estate Freeze Transactions Not Covered by Chapter 14, 23 
Tax Adviser 32 (1992); Richard L. Dees, The Slaying of Frankenstein's Monster: The Re-
peal and Replacement of Section 2036(c), 69 Taxes 151 (1991); S. Stacy Eastland, Business 
Valuation Issues, Including Analysis of Selected Parts of IRC Section 2701 and IRC Sec-
tion 2704, C743 ALI-ABA 327 (May 4, 1992); Larry W. Gibbs, A Family Limited Partner-
ship as Ule Centerpiece of an Estate Plan, 131 Tr. & Est. 52 (1992); Louis S. Harrison, 
Special Valuation Rules of Chapter 14 and Partnerships Can Save Transfer Taxes, 11 J. 
Partnership Tax'n 239 (1994); Kathryn G. Henkel & Elizabeth R Thmer, Family Limited 
Partnerships Can Playa Major Role in Asset Protection Planning, 11 J. Partnership Tax'n 
216 (1994); James R Hitchner & Kevin J. Rudd, The Use of Discounts in Estate and Gift 
Tax Valuations, 131 'fr. & Est. 49 (1992); Michael D. Mulligan & Angela F. Braly, Family 
Limited Partnerships Can Create Discounts, 21 Est. Plan. 195 (1994); TlIDothy C. Polacek 
& Richard A. Lehn, Tax Court Allows Sizable Fractional Interest Discounts, 133 Tr. & Est. 
29 (1994); Rick J. Taylor, Discount Partnership Arrangements Still Can Be Used to Re-
duce Transfer Taxes, 23 Tax Adviser 382 (1992). 
22 See Section m. 
23 Other differences between the estate and gift taxes are discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 288-93. 
24 674 Fold 761 (9Ul Cir. 1981). 
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ing stock to his son and the nonvoting stock to a charity. The court 
held that the nonvoting shares had a higher value for purposes of cal-
culating the gross estate than they did in calculating the charitable 
deduction.25 The court reasoned that, for purposes of the gross estate, 
the nonvoting shares would have to be valued together with the voting 
shares because the focus of the estate tax is on what the decedent 
owned at the time of death.26 This resulted in a higher valuation be-
cause the holder of both the voting and nonvoting shares could recapi-
talize the corporation and grant voting rights to the nonvoting shares, 
thereby increasing their value.27 In contrast, for purposes of calculat-
ing the charitable deduction, the court determined that the value of 
the nonvoting shares should be measured in isolation from the voting 
shares.28 This resulted in a smaller charitable deduction. 
Similarly, the courts have concluded that the value of assets trans-
ferred to trusts as bequests or gifts must be determined without regard 
to the terms of the trusts. Thus, the fact that a trust may impose sig-
nificant restrictions on the ability of the beneficiaries to exercise con-
trol of the corporation is irrelevant where the gift is complete upon 
the transfer of the stock to the trust.29 
III. VALUATION 
Because the estate and gift taxes are assessed on the "value" of 
property transferred, the definition of "value" has significant impor-
tance. Value is defined in the regulations as "fair market value," that 
is, "the price at which the property would change hands between a 
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion 
to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant 
facts."3o The willing buyer and seller are not, however, the donor and 
donee, but rather are hypothetical people with no relationship to each 
25 Id. at 772. 
26 Id. at 769. 
27 Id. In Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1434 (7th Cir. 1983), the Sev-
enth Circuit, relying on Ahmanson Foundation, also detennined that where the decedent 
held voting control of a corporation, his nonvoting stock should have the same value as his 
voting stock for estate tax purposes. 
28 Ahmanson Foundation, 674 F.2d at 772; see also Estate of Chenoweth v. Commis-
sioner, 88 T.C. 1577, 1589 (1987) (concluding that control premium would be appropriate 
for purposes of calculating marital deduction under § 2056 because decedent had be-
queathed 51 % of stock of corporation to his wife); cf. Ltr. Rul. 9403005 (Oct. 14, 1993) 
(ruling that where decedent transferred less than controlling block to spouse, minority dis-
count must be applied for purposes of calculating marital deduction). 
29 Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 1249, 1253-55 (7th Cir. 1988); 
Estate of Yak v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 942 (1991), rev'd on other grounds and 
remanded, 973 F.2d 1409 (8th Cir. 1992). 
30 Reg. § 20.2031-1(b); see also Reg. § 25.2512-1. 
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other.31 Because the hypothetical buyer-seller standard for determin-
ing value is the primary reason that taxpayers can use inter vivos gifts 
to remove control premiums from the transfer tax base, the valuation 
process merits further study. The next three Sections examine the val-
uation of closely held companies, real estate and partnerships. 
A. Closely Held Corporations 
Determining the fair market value of stock in a closely held corpo-
ration is difficult Where stock of a corporation is publicly traded, the 
mean between the highest and the lowest quoted selling price on the 
valuation date normally is used.32 The regulations direct, however, 
that the value of stock in a closely held corporation is to be deter-
mined based on "the company's net worth, prospective earning power 
and dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant factors."33 Other 
relevant factors include "the good will of the business; the economic 
outlook in the particular industry; the compants position in the indus-
try and its management; the degree of control of the business repre-
sented by the block of stock to be valued; and the values of securities 
of corporations engaged in the same or similar lines of business which 
are listed on a stock exchange."34 
The hypothetical willing buyer-willing seller standard is difficult to 
apply in the context of the closely held corporation because the use of 
these hypothetical people prevents consideration of the existing rela-
tionship between the donor and donee as well as among the donee 
and other stockholders. Relationships among stockholders of a 
closely held corporation normally constitute a significant component 
of value in such a corporation.3S Indeed, an authority on valuation 
lamented almost 60 years ago that "the willing-buyer, \villing-seller in-
cantation is a great bar to clear thinking in the law, and has no more 
place in legal opinions than it has in the literature of economic the-
ory."36 Another leading authority has commented that "in the case of 
closely held businesses, the Treasury \vill move heaven and earth to 
avoid using [the willing buyer-\villing seller standard]."37 
31 See, e.g., Ward v. Commissioner, 'OJ T.e. 78. lOS (1986); Estate of Andrews v. Com-
missioner. 79 T.e. 938. 955-56 (1982). 
32 Reg. §§ 2O.2031-2(b). 25.2512-2(b). 
33 Reg. §§ 2O.2031-2(f)(2), 25.2512-2(f)(2). 
34 Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 e.B. 237. modified by Rev. Rul. 65-193. 1965-2 
e.B. 370, and by Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 e.B. 327. and amplified by Rev. RuJ. now. 
1977-2 C.B. 319. Rev. Rul. 80-213. 1980-2 e.B. 101, and Rev. RuJ. 83-120, 1983-2 CoB. 170. 
3S See text accompanying notes 49-62. 
36 1 James C. Bonbright. The Valuation of Property 61 (1937). 
37 Jerry A. Kasner. The "Willing Buyer-Willing Seller Test" for Transfer Tax Valuation 
of Closely Held Business Interests Is Still Alive and Well. 56 Tax Notes 1056. 1056 (Aug. 
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In valuing stock in a closely held corporation, the courts generally 
engage in a multistep process.38 First, the value of the corporation as 
a whole is determined. If there is only one class of stock, the value of 
each share of stock is calculated by dividing the number of shares into 
that value. An appropriate discount to reflect lack of control and li-
quidity or an appropriate premium to reflect control then is applied to 
the block of stock subject to the transfer tax. 
Despite the apparently formalistic simplicity of the analytical pro-
cess, the lines separating the analytical steps are often blurred. As 
noted earlier, the regulations state that fair market value is calculated 
by considering the company's net worth, prospective earning power, 
dividend paying capacity and "other relevant factors."39 At the out-
set, application of each factor depends upon whether the court is valu-
ing the corporation as a whole from the perspective of a controlling or 
minority shareholder.40 For example, dividend paying capacity would 
not be heavily weighted by a stockholder who did not control the cor-
poration's board of directors, and who, therefore, could not insure 
that dividends would be paid.41 Similarly, the capitalization of earn-
ings method requires an estimate of earnings and a determination of 
the appropriate discount rate.42 The earnings estimate may be based 
on changes in the conduct of a business that only a controlling stock-
holder could implement.43 The appropriate discount rate also de-
pends on control, because control reduces risk and, therefore, the 
discount rate.44 Some courts have approached the problem by calcu-
lating value for the company as a whole assuming control and then 
applying a discount to calculate minority value.45 Other courts simply 
have valued the corporation as a whole assuming no control, and, 
therefore, have not discounted minority ownership further but have 
24, 1992). Professor Kasner points out that, in urging Congress to adopt § 2701, 'freasury 
abandoned the willing buyer-willing seller test. Id. 
38 See, e.g., Silvennan v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 931-33 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 
431 U.S. 938 (1977); Hicks v. United States, 486 F.2d 325, 327-29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 938 (1974); Wallace v. United States, 566 F. Supp. 904, 910-20 (D. Mass. 1982); 
Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 193, 216-52 (1990); see also Glenn M. 
Desmond & Richard E. Kelley, Business Valuation Handbook 233-41 (rev. ed. 1980). 
39 See text accompanying note 34. 
40 See Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 910-12. 
41 Id. at 912; see also Joseph D. Hartwig, Valuation Problems Before the Internal Reve-
nue Service and the Tax Court, 13 Inst. on Fed. Tax'n 1143, 1150-51 (1955). 
42 Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 912. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 913; see also Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 648, 667 (1975). 
4S See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 376 F.2d 402, 408-10 (5th Cir. 1967); Bartram v. 
Graham, 157 F. Supp. 757,769-70 (D. Conn. 1957); Estate of Frank v. Commissioner, 69 
T.C.M. (CCH) 2255, 2262-63 (1995); Estate of Rodriguez v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1033 (1989). 
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added premiums to control stockholders.46 A few confused courts ini-
tially valued the corporation assuming control and then added a con-
trol premium to the controlling block,47 in effect, double counting for 
the premium. Other courts have allowed a discount for lack of control 
in valuing stock without first stating whether the value from which it 
subtracted the discount was the value assuming control.48 
A discount for lack of control should be deducted only where the 
corporation was valued assuming control. If control is assumed, the 
court must carefully identify the attributes of control that provide 
value. This determination should be based upon the extent to which 
control can benefit the controlling stockholder.49 
To understand the value of control, it is helpful to review briefly the 
basic principles of corporate governance. Stockholders of a corpora-
tion do not directly manage the affairs of a corporation; instead, they 
elect directors who are charged with the duty of managing the corpo-
ration's affairs.50 Unless cumulative voting is permitted, the entire 
board of directors will be elected by the majority shareholder.51 
Moreover, under most state statutes, the entire board, or any individ-
ual member of the board, may be removed by the majority stock-
holder.52 Thus, the majority stockholder controls the corporation by 
controlling the board. 
The ability to control the board of directors offers a number of ben-
efits to a majority stockholder. For example, he can cause the corpo-
ration to employ himself or family members.53 This power may be 
particularly valuable where the corporation is taxable under sub-
chapter C because payment of dividends is not deductible, unlike the 
payment of reasonable compensation for services to the company.54 
Moreover, this transfer of cash to family members is not subject to the 
46 See, e.g, Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866, 870·71 (D. Conn. 1945); 
Estate of Jung v. Commissioner, 101 T.e. 412, 423·46 (1993); Estate of Trenchard v. Com· 
missioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2164,2171-74 (1995). 
47 See Parker, 376 F.2d 402; Driver v. United States, 76·2 USTC 'I 13,155 (W.O. \VIS. 
1976); see also Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 913-16. 
48 See, e.g., Estate of Newcomer v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1368 (W.O. Pa. 1978); 
Northern 1hist Co. v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 349 (1986); Estate of Berg v. Commissioner, 
61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2949 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1992). 
49 See David e. Bayne, The Investment Value of Control Stock, 54 Minn. L Rev. 1265, 
1281-88 (1970). 
50 Robert C. Qark, Corporate Law 94·95, 105 (1986). 
51 Id. at 362. 
52 See id. at 105. 
53 Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 986, 993 (1957); Steven 
E. Monical, Note, The Effect of Corporate Control on Valuation of Closely Held Corpo-
rate Stock for Federal Estate and Gift Tax Purposes, 1982 U. Ill. L Rev. 775, 782. 
54 IRC § 162(a)(l). 
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gift tax so long as the recipient is in fact perfonning services.55 In 
addition, control of the corporation provides a higher degree of job 
security for the controlling stockholder or family members than is nor-
mally available in the employment market.56 
Perhaps most importantly, corporate control reduces the intrinsic 
risk associated with an investment in the corporation. Financial econ-
omists frequently identify two sources of risk associated with a stock 
investment-intrinsic risk57 and systemic risk.58 Intrinsic risk is the 
risk associated with the particular company: generally the risk that it 
will be mismanaged or looted. Systemic risk is the risk associated with 
prevailing market conditions; in other words, the risk that demand for 
the stock will diminish because of adverse economic conditions. Nor-
mally, intrinsic risk is minimized by diversification;59 it also can be 
reduced by obtaining control. A controlling stockholder can select 
management that he believes is competent and honest.6o If they turn 
out not to be, he can remove them quickly and minimize the damage. 
Thus, a stockholder who owns a majority of stock normally will con-
trol the board of directors and, therefore, normally will control selec-
tion of management, dividend policy and his own employment. This 
control decreases the risks associated with incompetent or dishonest 
management, the stockholder's employment security and the timing of 
cash distributions. Additional benefits of control, however, become 
available only as the percentage of stock ownership increases.61 For 
example, many state statutes require a two-thirds vote of shareholders 
to liquidate a corporation, sell substantially all the corporation's as-
sets, merge the corporation or amend the certificate of incorpora-
SS It is important to insure that the amount of compensation is reasonably related to the 
services performed. If not, the compensation is treated as a taxable distribution to the 
controlling stockholder followed by a gift to the purported service performer. See, e.g., 
Johnson v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1316, 1323 (1980); Epstein v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 459, 
474-75 (1969) (taxing as a distribution to controlling stockholder a corporate transfer for 
insufficient consideration in trust to member of stockholder's family). 
S6 See Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the 
Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 25,36-37 (1988). 
57 See, e.g .• Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance 
137 (1991). Intrinsic risk also is referred to as unique, unsystematic, residual, specific or 
diversifiable risk. Id. at 137 n.13. 
S8 Systematic risk also is referred to as market risk or undiversifiable risk. Id. at 137 
n.14. 
S9 Id. at 136-38. 
60 See William D. Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in the Sale 
of Shares, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 505, 526 (1965); Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 905. 
61 See Shannon P. Pratt, Robert F. Reilly & Robert P. Schweihs, Valuing Small Business 
and Professional Practices 31 (2d ed. 1993) (stating that "the degree of control or lack of it 
may fall anywhere across a broad spectrum, depending on the percentage ownership, the 
distribution of other ownership interests, and state laws governing rights of various per-
centage ownership interests in circumstances pertinent to the valuation situation at hand"). 
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tion.62 The ability to compel liquidation of a corporation or sale of its 
assets may be valuable if the value of the corporation's assets exceeds 
the value of its ongoing business. Similarly, the ability to compel or 
amend a corporation's certificate of incorporation may be valuable if 
the stockholder wishes to expand the rights or economic benefits of a 
class of stock. 
Because benefits vary with degrees of ownership, it is important 
that a court identify the degree of control that it assumes in calculat-
ing the value of the corporation. Some courts have engaged in such a 
thoughtful analysis. For example, in Estate of Gray v. Comm;s-
sioner,63 the Tax Court determined that a purchaser of 50.487% of the 
voting stock of a corporation that owned a television station, newspa-
per and real estate would pay the sum of the liquidation values of the 
constituent businesses reduced by a discount of approximately 5.5%. 
The court applied the discount to reflect the "substantial size of the 
minority interest and the potential for dissension and legal complica-
tions in the event of a liquidation."64 In Estate of Yeager v. Comm;s-
sioner,65 the Tax Court determined that the best way to value the 
decedent's 50.25% stock interest in a real estate holding company was 
to value the real estate. The court then applied a discount to the sum 
of the values of the various parcels of real estate to reflect the fact that 
the decedent did not hold sufficient voting power to liquidate the cor-
poration without the support of other stockholders.66 
Similarly, when estimating the appropriate amount of discount for a 
minority interest, it is important to establish specifically what aspects 
of control that contribute to value are not available to the minority 
block.67 For example, if the valuation of the entire company included 
only the rights to control dividends, employment and management, 
the court should allow a discount in valuing a minority block to reflect 
only the fact that the minority stockholder does not have those pow-
ers. The discount should not reflect the inability to control liquida-
tion, sale of assets or recapitalization since those factors were not 
included in calculating the value of the company as a whole. 
It is important to note that attempts to value lack of control are 
complicated further by a trend in many state courts to impose fiduci-
62 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. L. ch. 156B, §§ 71, 78{c){I){iii), 100(a) (1995). 
63 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 254 (1993). 
64 Id. at 264. 
6S 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 524, 531 (1986). 
66 Id. at 533-34. 
67 See Fellows & Painter, note 4, at 911-12 (noting that "if a minority interest is being 
valued, a court should give less weight to dividend-paying capacity, to book value and to 
net asset value"). 
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ary duties on stockholders in closely held corporations.68 Imposition 
of such duties should slightly reduce the minority discount otherwise 
allowable.69 In Massachusetts, for example, shareholders owe a duty 
of utmost good faith and loyalty to one another.70 This duty, however, 
as interpreted by the Massachusetts courts, requires merely the exist-
ence of a bona fide business purpose for taking an action that is harm-
ful to another stockholder.71 For example, there must be a business 
purpose for terminating the employment of a minority stockholder.72 
Thus, the court's imposition of such duties does not reduce the risk 
associated with minority ownership to the level that would exist if the 
stockholder controlled the corporation. Moreover, the cost of litigat-
ing an allegedly wrongful act itself would support a minority discount. 
B. Real Estate 
The willing buyer-willing seller standard also applies to the valua-
tion of real estate. Using this standard, the courts frequently permit 
"minority" discounts for undivided interests in real estate.73 The term 
minority discount in the context of undivided interests in real estate, 
however, is a misnomer;74 an undivided fractional interest in land 
merely gives the possessor the right to the use and enjoyment of the 
68 See, e.g., Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551 (Alaska 1983); Sundberg v. Abbott, 423 
N.W.2d 686 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Forinash v. Daugherty, 697 S.W.2d 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1985); Russell v. First York Savings Co., 352 N.W.2d 871 (Neb. 1984); 68th Street Apts, Inc. 
v. Lauricella, 362 A.2d 78 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 
383 (N.D. 1987); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1984); Estate of Meller v. Adolf Meller Co., 554 A.2d 648 (R.I. 1989); see also Charles W. 
Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Impact 
upon Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 425, 433-40 (1990) (discussing 
nature of fiduciary duty). 
69 See generally Estate of Luton v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1044 (1994) (hold-
ing that safeguards provided by California statutes to stockholders would reduce size of 
minority discount); Murdock, note 68, at 472-73, 481-88 (arguing that fiduciary duties 
should reduce size of minority discounts in corporate appraisal rights proceedings). 
70 E.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
71 E.g., Zimmerman v. Bogoff, 524 N.E.2d 849, 853 (Mass. 1988); Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (Mass. 1976). If a bona fide purpose exists, 
the plaintiff must show that a less harmful method for achieving the purpose existed in 
order to recover damages. Id. 
72 Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64. 
73 See, e.g., Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982) (15% discount); 
Estate of Cervin v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 1115 (1994) (20% discount); Estate of 
Pillsbury v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1992) (15% discount); Zable v. Commis· 
sioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1330 (1990) (10% discount); Estate of Youle v. Commissioner, 56 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1594 (1989) (12.5% discount); Estate of van Loben Sels v. Commissioner, 
52 T.C.M. 731 (CCH) (1986) (combined minority discount and lack marketability discount 
of 60%); Estate of Quinn v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 352 (1982) (11 % discount). 
74 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 135·41 to 135·42. 
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land in a manner that does not conflict with the other owners.7S Even 
where an individual owns a 90% undivided interest in real estate, the 
value of the interest would not equal 90% of the value of the entire 
parcel because the 90% owner would have to obtain a partition of the 
property in order to obtain the right to exclusive possession of 90% of 
the property. Thus, a purchaser would deduct the costs and uncertain-
ties of obtaining a partition in determining the value of the 90% indi-
vidual interest.76 For example, in Estate of Pillsbury v. 
Commissioner77 the Tax Court allowed a 15% discount for a 77% un-
divided interest in real estate to reflect the illiquidity of the interest 
and the fact that the owner of the interest would have to share control 
of the parcel \vith the other joint owners. Because the owner of an 
undivided interest in real estate has a right to partition and to gain 
total control of a portion of the real estate, the discounts tend to be 
lower than for minority blocks of stock,18 usually only about 10 to 
20% below a pro rata portion of the value of the total parcel.79 In 
contrast, minority discounts for closely held corporations usually aver-
age 20 to 30%.80 
C. Partnership Interests 
The method used to value closely held corporations also is used to 
value partnership interests.81 Consequently, the courts have allowed 
7S Anna C. Fowler, Valuation of Undivided Interests in Realty: When Do the Parts Sum 
to Less Than the Whole?, 13 J. Real Est. Thx'n 123, 125 (1986). 
76 Id. For an excellent discussion of the valuation of other types of interests in real 
estate, specifically remainder interests and conservation easements, see Kingsbury Browne, 
Jr. & Walter G. Van Dorn, Charitable Gifts of Partial Interests in Real Property for Con-
servation Purposes, 29 Tax Law. 69, 86-93 (1975). 
77 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 284 (1992). 
78 Pratt et al., note 61, at 533. 
79 See note 73; see also Bruce W. Bringardner, Discounting the Value of Undivided 
Interests in Realty, 72 J. Tax'n 12, 15 (1990) (listing selected cases and discounts). 
80 Most cases do not separately state the discount for a minority interest in a closely held 
corporation, but instead combine it \vith a discount for lack of marketability. Recent cases 
that have separately stated the minority discount for closely held corporations, however. 
show that the minority discount ranges from 20 to 30%. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. 
Commissioner, 87 T.C. 349, 385 (1986) (25% discount); Estate of Frank v. Commissioner, 
69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255, 2263 (1995) (20% discount); Estate of Luton, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1045, 1050-55 (1994) (20% discount); Estate of Ford v. Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1507, 1518 (1993), aff'd, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995) (20% discount); Estate of Lenheim v. 
Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 356, 371 (1990) (30% discount); Carr v. Commissioner. 
49 T.C.M. (CCH) 507, 514 (1985) (25% discount). 
81 Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327 (stating that partnership interests should be valued 
using criteria for valuing stock of closely held corporations set forth in Rev. Rul. 54-60, 
1959-1 CB. 237); see also Reg. § 202031-3 (stating that for estate tax purposes. partner-
ship interests are to be valued under similar criteria as corporate stock, to the extent 
applicable). 
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minority discounts for interests as limited partners and general part-
ners.82 The courts, however, do not appear to have been as conscien-
tious in distinguishing subtle aspects of control that partners exert 
over partnership affairs as some courts have been in the corporate 
context. In Knott v. Commissioner,83 for example the Tax Court ap-
plied the same minority discount for both limited partner and general 
partner interests. The court noted that the donor still possessed a con-
trolling interest as a general partner and, therefore, minority discounts 
were appropriate for both the transferred limited and general partner-
ship interests.84 The court failed to explore, however, whether the 
partnership interests should be entitled to identical discounts. 
Usually, there are significant differences between the rights and ob-
ligations of a minority interest held as a general partner and one held 
as a limited partner that would justify different minority discounts. 
The general partner's liability for the obligations of the partnership8s 
may justify a larger discount, while the broader rights of the general 
partner may support a smaller minority discount. The general partner 
in a limited partnership also generally can participate much more ex-
tensively in management than limited partners can.86 Moreover, a 
general partner normally has the right to withdraw at any time and 
receive the value of her partnership interest, less any damages if her 
withdrawal was in breach of the partnership agreement.87 In contrast, 
a limited partner may withdraw and receive the fair value of the inter-
est only if the partnership agreement permits withdrawal. 88 If the 
partnership agreement is silent about the rights of limited partners to 
withdraw and does not designate a definite time for dissolving and 
winding up the partnership, a limited partner may withdraw only upon 
six months' notice to each general partner.89 
82 E.g., True v. United States, 547 F. Supp. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1982) (approving taxpay-
ers' partnership interest valuation that included discounts for minority interests, limited 
marketability and illiquidity); Estate of McCormick v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 
318, 332 (1995) (allowing minority partnership interests in general partnership discounts 
ranging from 18 to 32%); Moore v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1128, 1134 (1991) 
(allowing a 35% discount to reflect lack of controlling interest in a partnership); Estate of 
Watts v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 60, 63 (1985) (applying a 35% discount in valu-
ing minority interest in partnership), aff'd, 823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987). 
83 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 424 (1988). 
84 Id. at 432. 
85 Revised Uniform Ltd. Partnership Act (URULPA") § 403 (1985), 6A U.L.A. 177 
(1995). 
86 See id. §§ 302, 303, 403(a). 
III Id. §§ 602, 604. 
88 Id. §§ 603, 604. 
89 Id. 
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Partners also owe fiduciary duties to one another comparable to the 
fiduciary duties owed by shareholders in closely held companies.90 
The effect of such fiduciary duties should be a slight reduction in the 
minority discount otherwise allowable,91 but the courts have not con-
sidered this explicitly. 
IV. USING VALUATION METHODS TO REDUCE ESTATE AND 
GIFl'TAXES 
Because the focus of the gift tax regulations is on the value of a 
specific asset transferred to a specific donee, whereas the focus of the 
estate tax regulations is on the value of all property in the estate re-
gardless of the recipient, significant planning opportunities exist. 
For example, assume A owns 100% of the stock of a company, and 
the value of that interest is $1 million. This valuation includes the 
control premium. A has three children to whom she wishes to leave 
the corporation. If A dies owning 100% of the stock, the entire $1 
million is includable in her estate, even though she bequeaths one-
third of the stock to each of her children.92 Given this prospect, A 
decides to make inter vivos transfers of the stock to her three children. 
If A is married, she and her husband can give stock valued at $60,000 
to her children without incurring a gift tax.93 
In valuing the gifted stock, a lack of control discount would apply. 
Thus, although $60,000 of the $1 million value of the corporation 
would represent only 6% of the stock of the corporation, A, in fact, 
could give a higher percentage of the company to her children because 
of the minority discount. For example, if an appropriate minority dis-
count was 40%, A could give 10% of her stock per year to her chil-
dren without incurring any gift tax. This would enable her to 
eliminate her control of the corporation in five years. 
Suppose, however, that A decided to give all her stock to her three 
children in one year, each child receiving one-third of the stock of the 
company. What valuation should be used to determine the amount of 
the gift tax? Because a controlling block of the stock is given in the 
90 See, e.g., Reeve v. Folly Hill Ltd. Partnership, 628 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Mass. App. CL 
1994); see also text accompanying notes 68-72. 
91 See text accompanying notes 68-72. 
92 See, e.g., Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1426-30 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Estate of Feldmar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 118, 130 (1988). 
93 Section 2503(b) allows each donor a $10,000 annual exclusion for gifts to each donee. 
Section 2513(a) allows spouses to elect to treat gifts made by one spouse as made one-half 
by each spouse. Gifts by A and her spouse in excess of $20,000 to each donee also may not 
be taxable because the unified credit, IRC § 2010(a), allows a donor to make an additional 
$600,000 of gifts during the donor's lifetime on a tax-free basis. See text accompanying 
notes 288-90 for a discussion of how a donor may use the unified credit advantageously. 
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same year, it could be argued that the stock should be valued with the 
control premium.94 The statutory language of § 2501, which imposes a 
gift tax on the transfer of property during a calendar year and does 
not specifically refer to valuation based on the identity of the donees, 
supports this view.95 Because the estate tax would value the control 
block with a premium and because a primary purpose of the gift tax is 
to prevent the circumvention of the estate tax,96 the same principles 
should apply. Section § 25.2512-2( e) of the regulations, which states 
that the gifted stock is to be valued "with reference to each separate 
gift," makes that argument difficult, however. The courts have ap-
plied this regulation to require that each gift be valued in isolation 
from other contemporaneous gifts to other donees.97 
Suppose alternatively, that A decided to give all the shares over a 
period of years to one child. For example, she gives 10% of her stock 
to one child each year for 10 years. Assuming the step transaction 
doctrine did not apply, how should the annual gifts be valued?98 
One approach would be to apply the minority discount to each gift 
of stock every year. A second approach would be to apply a minority 
discount to the gifts in the first five years and then control premiums 
to the gifts in the subsequent five years. The focus of § 25.2512-( e) of 
94 David E. Watts, The Fair Market Value of Actively Traded Securities, 30 Tax Law. 51, 
71 (1976); see Michael H. Simpson, Note, Federal Gift Tax Regulation 25.2512-2(e)-The 
Use of the Blockage Principle, 1974 Wisc. L. Rev. 612, 619-22 (arguing that although the 
statutory scheme may be interpreted as requiring the value of each gift to be determined, it 
does not require value to be determined in isolation from all other gifts). 
9S Watts, note 94, at 71. 
96 See note 5. 
rn Rushton v. Commissioner, 498 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir. 1974); Whittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 
127 F. Supp. 710, 720 (D. Conn. 1954); Estate of Heppenstall v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 136, 143 (1949); cf. Lawrence C. Phipps, 43 B.T.A. 10lD, 1014 (1940) (refusing to 
aggregate gifts of stock made to different donees for purposes of applying blockage dis-
count), aff'd, 127 F.2d 214, 217 (10th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 645 (1944). The 
Service took the same view in a recent technical advice memorandum in which it deter-
mined that contemporaneous gifts by a donor of all the stock of a company to 11 donees 
should be valued in isolation and would be eligible for minority discounts. T.A.M. 9449001 
(Mar. 11, 1994). 
98 The courts have not considered this issue in the context of the gift tax. At first glance, 
it may appear that Brown v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 498 (1966), is relevant. In 
that case, the taxpayer transferred in 1961 stock in a closely held business to her son that 
was sufficient to give the son majority ownership. She valued the shares at $2,500 per 
share, the same valuation that had been used for estate tax purposes of the majority inter-
est held by her husband at his death in 1955. The Tax Court rejected the Service's argu-
ment for a higher valuation. Although the $2,500 per share valuation used by the taxpayer 
and accepted by the court was the same $2,500 per share value used to value the control-
ling block at death, the court did not seem to be applying a control premium to the shares 
that the taxpayer gave to her son. The court stated, "The 42 shares involved herein did not 
represent a controlling interest in the Company." Id. at 500. Thus, it appears to have been 
merely coincidental that the shares had the same value as the controlling block valued six 
years earlier. 
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the regulations suggests that the first approach is the correct one. The 
statement that value is determined "with reference to each separate 
gift" suggests that the inquiry is what a willing buyer would pay for the 
specific block of stock given in a particular year. Because only 10% is 
given each year, a minority discount should apply. This approach also 
is consistent with the willing buyer-willing seller standard, which sug-
gests that the subjective value of the gift to the donee is irrelevant. 
Indeed, in the context of the estate tax, the Service, relying upon the 
willing buyer-willing seller standard, recently ruled that the value of a 
decedent's 48.59% block of the stock of a corporation bequeathed to 
his son, who already owned 51.41 % of the stock, should be deter-
mined without regard to the son's ownership, and, therefore, that a 
minority discount was appropriate.99 Moreover, the Tax Court, rely-
ing upon the willing buyer-willing seller standard, also has allowed mi-
nority discounts in calculating the estate tax for stock passing at death 
to family members who already owned significant amounts of stoCk.IOO 
It is interesting to note that in the context of the income tax where 
the regulations do not explicitly contain the willing buyer-willing seller 
standard for defining fair market value, the courts have refused to 
permit minority discounts if the taxpayer receiving shares that repre-
sented a minority interest already owned a majority interest.IOI 
Although this line of cases might be viewed as supporting the argu-
ment that the identity of the donee should be considered in valuing 
the gift, analogy to income tax cases is inappropriate. The income tax, 
in general, seeks to impose an income tax on a taxpayer's accession to 
wealth.102 Consequently, it is appropriate to consider the identity and 
characteristics of the recipient in measuring the recipient's accession 
to wealth. The gift tax, however, focuses on what is transferred by the 
donor to the donee. Moreover, even in the income tax area, courts 
seem reluctant to engage in a subjective inquiry of the actual value to 
99 T.A.M. 9432001 (Aug. 12, 1994). 
100 See, e.g., Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 T.e. 860 (1978), (applying minority dis-
count where decedent held 40% undivided interest in closely held corporate stock that 
passed to his spouse who already owned 40%); see also Estate of Zaiger v. Commissioner, 
64 T.C. 927 (1975). 
101 In Andrews v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 459 (1976), the taxpayer exchanged 
30% of the stock in one corporation for 30% of the stock in a corporation in which he 
already had a 70% interest In determining that a discount for lack of marketability should 
be allowed in setting the fair market value, the court commented approvingly on the tax-
payer's failure to seek a minority discount The court stated, "We understand why no 
discount for a minority interest was taken (as the stock was being transferred to the major-
ity shareholder) ... " Id. at 463. See also Thmer v. Commissioner. 23 T.e.M. (CCH) 952 
(1964), aff'd, 343 F2d 150 (4th Cir. 1965) (rejecting minority discount for taxpayer who 
already controlled corporation, and who received. as taxable compensation, additional 
shares of stock in corporation, noting that block was worth more. not less. to him). 
102 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
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the recipient. Instead, the courts usually employ an objective measure 
for determining the fair market value of the property by using the 
familiar willing buyer-willing seller, or similar standard.103 The in-
come tax cases that measure the subjective value of an asset to the 
recipient appear to be confined to narrow contexts.104 
V. THE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
These tax reduction strategies are based upon an important factual 
assumption-that when control is eliminated, value is destroyed. Yet, 
it does not make economic sense to destroy value. Despite this con-
tradiction, taxpayers have successfully argued that value does in fact 
disappear. The taxpayer in Estate of Harrison v. CommissionerlOS gal-
lantly explained to the court in its brief: 
Value does appear and disappear frequently in ordinary 
transactions. If that is not apparent, only some thought is 
needed to make it so. Suppose A, B, and C contribute $100 
each to form a corporation, each receiving one share. With 
only one share, none of them alone can force a liquidation so 
as to get his $100 back. Under the willing buyer-seller test, 
what is the value of A's share? The value has decreased 
from the $100 contributed to something much smaller, per-
haps $45, that reflects the loss of a right to liquidate. Where 
did the lost $55 go? It did not go to B or C, for each of them 
has suffered the same $55 loss. Such a loss may continue in-
definitely as the corporation does business. We can see that 
readily by noting that the stocks of hundred of corporations 
sell on exchanges at substantially below liquidation values.106 
The brief's example appears persuasive because it focuses on the 
value of the stock to a hypothetical third party. Each shareholder, 
however, presumably would state that his stock has a value of $100 to 
her. Otherwise, they never would have invested $100. 
103 See, e.g., Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1963); Kaplan v. United 
States, 279 F. Supp 709, 711 (D. Ariz. 1967); Rooney v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 523, 527 
(1987); see also Emanuel L. Gordon, What Is Fair Market Value?, 8 Tax L. Rev. 35 (1952-
53). 
104 The narrow contexts include the Andrews and Turner cases discussed in note 101, 
and situations involving the taxpayer's receipt of a contest prize. See McCoy v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C. 841 (1962); Thmer v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 462 (1954). But see 
Wade v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. 413 (1988) (using costs of prize to determine income to 
recipients). 
105 52 T.C.M. 1306 (1987). 
106 Brief for Petitioner at 27, 52 T.C.M. 1306 (1987), quoted in S. Stacy Eastland, Family 
Partnerships 5 (1994). 
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What are the sources of this value? If, A, B or C intends to be 
involved in the day-to-day activities of the corporation, one source of 
value is an intimate knowledge of the corporation's activities.l07 This 
knowledge reduces the intrinsic risk associated \vith the corporation. 
Moreover, their day-to-day contact gives them influence over the con-
duct of the corporation's affairs that further enhances the value of the 
investment. In addition, the mix of personalities and skills of the 
shareholders may create a synergy that will prove profitable. Stated 
another way, while a third party might pay only $45 for A's one share 
of stock, a third party might very well pay $100 to step into A's shoes 
and acquire all of A's interest and relations in the corporation as well 
as A's one share of stock. 
The difficulty is that the transfer taxes apply only to the value of 
what could be transferred to a hypothetical third party. A may not be 
able to transfer his synergistic working relationship with the other 
shareholders or his ability to participate in the corporation's activities 
to any hypothetical third party. A, however, could transfer these at-
tributes to someone he knows well and that anticipates will work well 
with the other owners. If the transferee has a close family relationship 
or friendship with Band C, the transferee may be able to step into A's 
shoes and exert influence over the conduct of corporate affairs. Thus, 
it is very likely where cordial relationships exist among the transferee 
and B and C that A could transfer some of the value inherent in his 
relationship with B and C. 
The challenge is whether the relationship of stockholders or part-
ners should be considered for estate and gift tax purposes. As dis-
cussed below, the legislative response has been ambivalent, while the 
judicial response has been negative. 
A. Legislative Response 
1. Legislation Addressing Transfers of Opportunities 
Congress has addressed the taxability of transferred opportunities 
on a rather haphazard basis. On the one hand, Congress has refused 
through legislation to eliminate minority discounts for the transfer of 
assets even though the circumstances of the transfer indicated that the 
owners would work together and, therefore, that control value had 
not been destroyed. For example, in November, 1984, Treasury pro-
posed as follows: 
107 See Pratt et aI., note 61, at 56. 
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The value for transfer tax purposes of a fractional interest in 
any asset owned, in whole or in part, by a donor or decedent 
would be a pro rata share of the fair market value of that 
portion of the asset owned by the donor or decedent. Prior 
gifts of fractional interests in the asset, as well as any frac-
tional interests in the asset held by the transferor's spouse, 
would be attributed to the donor or decedent for purposes of 
determining the value of the fractional interest 
transferred. lOB 
The reason for the proposal was a concern that minority discounts 
reduced the value of property within the transfer tax base in a manner 
"inconsistent with economic reality."I09 The President's tax reform 
proposal to Congress in May, 1985, however, did not include this 
proposal.HO 
Similarly, in 1987, the House Budget Committee proposed language 
stating that the value of stock is "deemed to be equal to its pro rata 
share of all the stock of the same class in such corporation, unless a 
different value is established by clear and convincing evidence."111 
The committee report explained: 
In determining whether a different value can be established 
under the clear and convincing evidence standard, all stock 
held, directly or indirectly, by an individual or by members 
of such individual's family is treated as held by one person. 
Thus, a minority discount will not be appropriate for trans-
fers between family members unless all the stock held by 
that person or the person's family would qualify for the 
discoun t.112 
The House proposal, however, was not included in the Senate bill or 
the conference report.113 
On the other hand, Congress has adopted rules to prevent share-
holders or partners from transferring the opportunity to participate in 
future appreciation of corporations or partnerships in transactions 
commonly referred to as "estate freezes." In the typical estate freeze, 
an older generation transfers ownership rights to a younger genera-
tion that are likely to appreciate in value while retaining interests that 
108 Treasury I, note 4, at 387. 
109 Id. at 386-87. 
110 See the President's Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplic· 
ity (1985). 
111 H.R. Rep. No. 391, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 1043 (1987). 
112 Id. 
113 H.R. Rep. No. 495, note 8, at 994-95, reprinted in 1987-3 C.B. 193,247·48. 
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are unlikely to appreciate.114 Because the value of the retained inter-
est is not likely to appreciate, the older generation has "frozen" the 
value of property that will be includable in its estate. Any future ap-
preciation in the transferred interest will escape taxation.llS 
For example, in a classic estate freeze, an older generation transfers 
common stock to the younger generation and retains preferred stock 
with a fixed dividend right. Even if the company becomes more prof-
itable, the preferred stock will not appreciate because of its fixed divi-
dend right. The future appreciation in common stock will not be 
subject to the estate or gift tax.116 
Congress first sought to address this problem in 1987 by adopting 
§ 2036(c). Because § 2036(c) was deemed too vague,117 Congress re-
pealed it in 1990118 and replaced it with § 2701.119 In general, § 2701 
deals ,vith abuses in calculating the value of the transferred interests, 
the common stock in the above example.120 It assumes that the value 
of the common stock equals the value of all stock interests, common 
and preferred, minus the value of the preferred stock. The preferred 
stock generally is treated as having a zero value if the corporation is a 
"controlled entity" unless the preferred stock has a cumulative right 
to receive dividends.121 A "controlled entity" is defined as a corpora-
tion or partnership in which at least 50% of the total voting power or 
fair market value of the equity interests are owned immediately 
before the transfer "by the transferor, applicable family members, and 
any lineal descendants of the parents of the transferor or the trans-
feror's spouse."l22 
Note that § 2701 assumes that, where the transferees have voting 
control and are family members, they will maximize the transferred 
value. The requirement that dividends be cumulative in the context of 
a family-controlled entity, in effect, creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion that the family members will work together to increase the value 
114 Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Federal Transfer Tax Conse-
quences of Estate Freezes at 9 (Comm. Print 1990). 
115 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 136-2, 136-3. 
116 rd. 
117 For various critiques of § 2036(c), see, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Valuation Freezes After 
the 1988 Act: The Impact of Section 2036(c) on Closely Held Businesses, 31 Wm. & Mary 
L. Rev. 67 (1989); Joseph M. Dodge, Rethinking Section 2036(c), 49 Tax Notes 199 (Oct. 8, 
1990) [hereinafter Rethinking]; Eastland, Legacy, note 9. 
118 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11601(a), 104 
Stat. 1388. 
119 rd. § 11602(a), 104 Stat. at 1388-498. 
120 See Louis S. Harrison, The Real Implications of the New Transfer Tax Valuation 
Rules-Success Or Failure?, 47 Tax Law. 885, 892-94, 903-07 (1994) [hereinafter 
Implications 1. 
UI Reg. § 252701-2(a), -2(b)(6), -2(c)(4). 
122 Reg. § 252701-2(b)(5). 
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of the transferred interest after the taxable transfer by causing the 
company not to pay dividends. Congress apparently has not been 
willing to assume, however, that family members will work together 
with respect to other management matters. Section 2701 does not af-
fect the availability of minority discounts. The regulations under 
§ 2701 continue to allow a minority discount in calculating the value 
of the transferred interests that would have been allowed prior to the 
adoption of § 2701.123 
2. Legislation Addressing Lapsing Restrictions and Voting Rights 
Estate planners also have used the concept of disappearing value by 
employing formal legal rights that lapse upon the death of the holder. 
Frequently, a taxpayer would hold stock in a family owned corpora-
tion or an interest in a family owned partnership that would include 
the right to liquidate. If the corporation or partnership had valuable 
assets, that right may cause the stock or partnership interest to be 
more valuable than it would have been without a liquidation right. In 
order to minimize the value of the partnership interest or stock in the 
taxpayer's estate, the liquidation right would lapse upon the tax-
payer's death. 
The lapse of the liquidation right could result in a substantial dimi-
nution in the value of assets held by the estate and, therefore, a signifi-
cant decrease in estate tax. Note, however, that the lapse would have 
no adverse economic impact on the legatees or other family members 
because the family's control of the partnership or corporation would 
allow the family to liquidate the business at will. For example, in Es-
tate of Harrison v. Commissioner,124 the taxpayer and the Service stip-
ulated that a limited partnership interest in a partnership that held 
valuable real estate, oil and gas interests and marketable securities 
would have a value of more than $59 million if accompanied by a liq-
uidation right but only $33 million without a liquidation right.125 The 
court held that because the taxpayer's liquidation right lapsed upon 
death, the limited partnership interest should be valued at the lower 
amount even though the taxpayer's family continued to control the 
partnership.126 
123 Reg. § 25.2701-3(b)(4); see T.D. 8395, 1992-1 C.B. 316, 318 (stating that § 2701 does 
not "affect minority discounts otherwise available under law in effect before" enactment of 
§ 2701). 
124 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1306 (1987). 
125 Id. at 1308. 
126 The court rejected the Service's argument that the lapse of the liquidation right had 
transferred "something of value" to the taxpayer's two sons who were the only other part-
ners because the Service had stipulated the value of the son's partnership interests had 
remained the same after the lapse. Id. at 1309; see also Estate of Watts v. Commissioner, 
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The legislative response to Estate of Harrison was § 2704(a), 
adopted as part of a major revision of the estate and gift taxes in 
1990.127 Section 2704(a) provides that, in certain situations, the lapse 
of a voting or liquidation right with respect to an interest in an entity 
is a transfer for estate and gift tax purposes. The amount of the trans-
fer is the reduction in value attributable to the lapse.l28 
Section 2704(a) applies where the holder of the lapsed voting or 
liquidation right and the holder's family control the entity immedi-
ately before and after the lapse.129 The holder and holder'S family 
must be able to liquidate an interest that the holder held and could 
have liquidated prior to the lapse.13o In determining whether the in-
terest could be liquidated after the lapse, restrictions on liquidation 
that may be removed by the holder or holder's family are disre-
garded.131 In effect, § 2704 assumes that there has been no diminution 
in value when a liquidation right lapses, because the family, viewed as 
a whole, still has the power to liquidate the entity.132 
The amount of the transfer for estate or gift tax purposes is the 
difference between the value of all interests in the entity held by the 
taxpayer before the lapse and the value of such interests after the 
823 F.2d 483 (11th Cir. 1987) (refusing to assign liquidation value to decedent's general 
partnership interest for estate tax purposes where partnership agreement did not allow 
liquidation of partnership to occur on partner's death.) 
127 Sen. Rep. on Proposed Revision of Estate Freeze Rules, 136 Cong. Rec. S15,629, 
15,679, 15,681 (1990). 
128 Reg. § 25.2704-1(d). 
129 Reg. § 25.2704-1(a)(1). 
130 Reg. § 25.2704-1(c)(2)(i). 
131 Reg. §§ 25.2704-1(c) (2) (i) (B), 1.2704-2(b). 
132 Although § 2704(a) was enacted in response to Harrison, a limited partnership inter-
est may be valued using liquidation value even if § 2704(a) does not apply. In Harrison, 
each general partner had the capacity to liquidate the partnership pursuant to the partner-
ship agreement. Liquidation value arguably applies to a limited partnership interest held 
by a general partner who is the only general partner in the limited partnership even if the 
partnership agreement does not contain a provision like the one in Harrison that explicitly 
allows the general partner to liquidate the partnership. 
This result is due to the implicit power of the sole general partner who is also a limited 
partner of the partnership to compel liquidation. Under RULPA § 801(4), 6A U.LA. 240 
(1995), a general partner may cause a liquidation of a limited partnership and, thereby, of 
his general partnership and limited partnership interests, by withdrawing from the partner-
ship, unless the remaining general partners agree to continue the partnership. A with-
drawal event includes resignation or death. If there are no general partners remaining 
after a withdrawal event, all the limited partners must agree to continue the partnership in 
order for the partnership not to be liquidated. Absent such consensus, the limited partner-
ship will be liquidated and each partner will receive the value of his partnership interest. 
Id. The estate of a deceased general partner could vote the decedent's limited partnership 
interest to force a liquidation. Mulligan & Braly. note 21. at 200. The ability of the estate 
to compel a liquidation would likely cause a court to use a liquidation value for the dece-
dent's limited partnership interest if the liquidation value was greater than going concern 
value. 
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lapse.133 Section 2704 does not identify the transferee, however. 
Thus, it is possible that the deemed transfer will not qualify for a mari-
tal deduction,134 charitable deduction135 or annual gift exclusion of 
$10,000136 even where the identity of the transferee is obvious be-
cause, for example, there is only one other partner.137 
Section 2704(a) also applies to a lapse of any "voting right." Voting 
right is defined as "a right to vote with respect to any matter of the 
entity,"138 for example, the right of a general partner to participate in 
partnership management.139 The holder of a lapsed voting right in a 
family controlled entity is treated as having made a taxable transfer.140 
Again, the value of the transfer is the difference between the value of 
all interests in the entity held by the taxpayer before the lapse and the 
value of such interests after the lapse.141 Where the lapse of voting 
rights results in the holder losing control of the entity, the amount 
transferred should include the value of the control premium.142 
One remarkable aspect of § 2704(a) is that it, in effect, creates an 
irrebuttable presumption that family members will cooperate. It as-
sumes that the transferor's voting or liquidation right has not disap-
peared but rather has been transferred to family members. Thus, in 
the narrow context of voting and liquidation rights, Congress has done 
what it refused to do in the broader context of minority discounts for 
assets held by family members.143 Indeed, Congress was very careful 
to point out that it did not intend to change the treatment of minority 
discounts or other discounts under present law.144 
The failure of Congress to extend the presumption in §§ 2701 and 
2704 that family members will cooperate to achieve minority discounts 
may be based on two assumptions. FIrst, it may reflect a belief that 
the Service has adequate tools to deal with abusive applications of 
minority discounts in the courts. Second, it may reflect a judgment 
133 Reg. § 25.2704-1(d). 
134 IRC §§ 2050, 2523. 
135 IRC § 2522. 
136 IRC § 2503(b). 
137 See Dees, Monster, note 9, at 906. 
138 Reg. § 25.2704-1(a)(2)(iv). 
139 Id. 
140 IRC § 2704(a). 
141 IRC § 2704(a)(2); Reg. § 25.2704-1(d). 
142 Harrison, Implications, note 120, at 914. 
143 In § 2704(b), Congress similarly has assumed that family members would cooperate 
to remove certain restrictions on liquidating family controlled entities. See Dees, Monster, 
note 9, and Harrison, Implications, note 120, for discussions of § 2704(b) and some 
problems that arise from the interaction of § 2704(b) with RULPA. 
144 See H.R. Rep. No. 964, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1130, 1137 (Conf. Rep.) (1990), re-
printed in 1991-2 C.B. 560. 
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that minority discounts reflect sound tax policy. As discussed below, 
neither assumption is Valid.145 
B. The Judicial Response 
1. Rejection of Family Attribution 
The courts have not been responsive to attempts by the Service to 
address abusive applications of minority discounts. Until recently, the 
Service took the position, set forth in Revenue Ruling 81-253,146 that 
control discounts should not be allowed where a majority stockholder 
made lifetime gifts of stock to family members. The Service reasoned 
that had the majority stockholder died holding a majority interest, the 
stock in her or his estate would have been valued without a minority 
discount,147 Because the purpose of the gift tax is to prevent the 
avoidance of estate taxes though lifetime gifts,l48 the Service argued 
that lifetime gifts of stock by a majority stockholder similarly should 
not benefit from a minority discount. The Service also reasoned that 
when a controlling block of stock is owned by members of a family, 
"there is a unity of ownership and interest, and the shares owned by 
family members should be valued as part of that controlling inter-
est."149 Recognizing that a unity of interest would not exist where 
family discord existed, the Service also stated that "where there is evi-
dence of family discord or other factors indicating that the family 
would not act as a unit in controlling the corporation, a minority dis-
count may be allowed."150 
The Service defended its position in Revenue Ruling 81-253 by rely-
ing upon four earlier cases that arguably had rejected a minority dis-
count where a majority stockholder had made lifetime gifts to family 
members. Two of the cases,lSI however, involved application of the 
145 See Sections VI and VII. 
146 1981-2 C.B. 187, revoked by Rev. Rul. 93-12. 1993-1 C.B. 202; see also T.A.M. 
8010017 (Dec. 6, 1979); G.C.M. 38,520 (Sept. 30, 1980). 
147 G.C.M. 38,520, note 146, at 18. 
148 See note 5. 
149 Rev. Rul. 81-253, 1981-2 C.B. at 188. 
150 Id. 
lSI In the first step transaction case, Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. 
Iowa 1968), the taxpayer transferred to trusts for the benefit of her grandchildren an 
amount of stock sufficient to reduce her percentage of stock ownership in a closely held 
corporation to 50%. The taxpayer valued her gifts of stock at $l15 per share, arguing that 
the gifts were entitled to a minority discount. Three weeks after the transfer, an unrelated 
third party purchased a majority interest in the corporation for $107.45 per share from the 
donee and taxpayer. The third party subsequently purchased additional shares at $l15 per 
share. The court rejected the taxpayer's valuation of $315 per share for stock she had 
given to the donee because it found that at the time of the gifts, the taxpayer and donee 
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step transaction doctrine.152 A very strained interpretation of the 
third case suggests that the court of appeals implicitly rejected a mi-
nority discount for stock in a holding company transferred by the tax-
payer to family members.153 In the fourth case, the court of appeals 
obliquely condemned the concept of minority discounts but appeared 
to accept a valuation based on a minority interest although the trans-
feror's family controlled all the stoCk.154 
In contrast to the questionable authority supporting family attribu-
tion, the weight of authority prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 
81-253 suggested that a minority discount should apply to the family 
"knew that an acceptable offer to sell could be made ... and that an intention to sell had 
been formed. Id. at 351. 
In the second step transaction case, Driver v. United States, 76-2 USTC <J[ 13,155 {W.D. 
Wis. 1976}, the taxpayer transferred 66% of the stock of a corporation to her nephew and 
the nephew's family in two transfers two days apart. The court refused to allow the tax-
payer a minority discount because it determined that the gifts were merely "an effort to 
convert a transfer of a majority interest into one of a minority interest by effecting it in two 
installments two days apart. Id. at 85,699. 
152 Taxpayers also have applied the step transaction doctrine to their advantage. For 
example, in Ivey v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 172 (1983), the taxpayers successfully 
argued that their charitable gifts of separate contiguous tracts of land should be valued as 
though there had been a combined gift of one large tract, thereby enabling a larger charita-
ble deduction. Id. at 174-75. 
153 Richardson v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 1039 (1943), aff'd, 151 F.2d 102 (2d 
Cir. 1945). The holding company's assets consisted primarily of marketable securities. TIle 
lower court determined that the only practical way to value the transferred stock was to 
consider the value of the marketable securities and rejected the application of a minority 
discount. On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's valuation on the 
ground that the lower court's use of the term "fair market value" sufficiently attested to 
the use of a proper standard. 151 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 796 
(1946). Thus, while the lower court had rejected a minority discount, the court of appeals 
never squarely addressed the issue. 
154 Hamm v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1963), aff'g 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1814 
(1961), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964). The taxpayer, who owned 263 shares of stock of a 
closely held corporation, transferred the stock to his children in trusts. All the other stock 
of the company was held by the taxpayer's sisters and their children and by the taxpayer's 
son. The taxpayer treated the stock as having a value of $100 per share. The Service 
asserted that the stock had a fair market value of $8,506 per share. In upholding the Ser-
vice's valuation, the Tax Court did not appear to consider a minority discount, although it 
is not clear whether the court's valuation was premised on ownership of all the common 
stock of the company or upon minority ownership. On appeal, the taxpayer challenged the 
Tax Court's decision, arguing that a minority discount should be allowed. In a rather 
strained interpretation, the Eighth Circuit concluded that because the Tax Court had re-
peatedly referred to the value of the 263 1/3 shares transferred by gift, it had not based its 
valuation on ownership of all the stock of the company but rather on only 263 113 shares. 
Condemning the concept of minority discount with faint praise, the court then stated: 
If, in view of the over-all complete ownership of the common by ... [tax-
payer's] family, this minority interest point has any real validity, the foregoing 
[references to 263 113 shares] convincingly demonstrates that the minority in-
terest aspect was considered by the court and that its determination was made 
as to that specific interest. 
Id. at 941. 
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corp orations. ISS Most of the earlier cases, however, failed to explain 
specifically why minority interests in family corporations should qual-
ify for minority discounts. In Estate of Bright v. United States,156 a 
case decided just prior to the issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-253, 
however, the Fifth Circuit provided a rationale. The court stated that 
established case law requires rejection of the family attribution argu-
ment,157 because it is "logically inconsistent \vith the willing buyer-
seller rule."IS8 The court reasoned that under this rule, the identity of 
the decedent is irrelevant and, therefore, there can be no attribution 
to the decedent's relatives. The court also said that it was rejecting 
family attribution because it is "important policy that the law should 
be stable and predictable. "159 
Similarly, after the issuance of Revenue Ruling 81-253, the Tax 
Court continued to reject the Service's argument for application of the 
family attribution rule,160 noting that, because Congress has ehl'licitly 
required it in other areas, the doctrine should not be judicially grafted 
into a new area.161 Indeed, in a subsequent case, the court awarded 
litigation costs to the taxpayer on the grounds that the Service's liti-
gating posture in seeking to deny a minority discount for a family 
business was unreasonable.162 The courts also rejected family attribu-
tion in cases involving real estate.163 
155 Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1001 (5th Cir. 1981); Clark v. United 
States,75-1 USTC 113,076 (E.D.N.e. 1975); Obermer v. United States, 238 F. Supp. 29, 34 
(D. Haw. 1964); Bartram v. Graham, 157 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Conn. 1957); Whittemore v. 
Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 710, 721-22 (D. Conn. 1954); Estate of Lee v. Commissioner, 69 
T.C. 860, 875-76 (1978). 
156 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981). The decedent and her husband owned as community 
property 55% of the common stock of several corporations and unrelated individuals 
owned the other 45%. In valuing the 275% block of stock that was included in the dece-
dent's estate, the Service argued that a minority discount should not be allowed because 
prior to death, the decedent and her husband had held their stock as a controlling block 
and that, after her death, her husband held the block as trustee of a testamentary trust for 
their children. In effect, the Service sought to attribute the husband's stock to the dece-
dent in order to apply a control premium in valuing the decedent's stock. 
157 Id. at 1002. 
158 Id. at 1005-06. 
159 Id. at 1006. 
160 See, e.g., Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, 79 T.e. 938 (1982) (permitting minor-
ity discounts where decedent held 20% of stock in four companies and other 80% of the 
stock was held by decedent's brothers and sisters); Ward v. Commissioner, 87 T.e. 78, 108 
(1986). 
161 Estate of Andrews, 79 T.e. at 995. 
162 Minihan v. Commissioner, 88 T.e. 492 (1987). 
163 In LeFrak v. Commissioner, 66 T.e.M. (CCH) 1297 (1993), the court rejected the 
Service's argument that a minority discount should not be allowed for fractional interests 
in real estate, stating: 
The mere fact that all persons with ownership interests in the buildings are 
family members should not preclude allowance of a minority discount because 
the possibility of internecine bickering and dissension can never be excluded, 
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This string of defeats finally caused the Service to change its litigat-
ing posture and revoke Revenue Ruling 81-253, stating "[A] minority 
discount will not be disallowed solely because a transferred interest, 
when aggregated with interests held by family members, would be a 
part of a controlling interest. "164 
2. Critique of the Judicial Response 
In summary, the courts have rejected family attribution for four rea-
sons: (1) prior precedents should not be readily overturned; (2) the 
willing buyer-willing seller standard does not permit consideration of 
the characteristics of the actual transferee; (3) a subjective inquiry of 
the behavior of heirs and legatees would be boundless and (4) Con-
gress, not the courts, should create a family attribution rule. 
With respect to the first rationale, while courts generally respect 
precedent, they will reject stare decisis if it is incorrect.165 Thus, the 
validity of the courts' analysis rests upon the correctness of the latter 
three rationales. The following analysis shows that only the rationale 
relating to the willing buyer-willing seller standard is correct, but that 
the approach of the courts creates a bias in favor of low valuations of 
minority interests in family-controlled corporations and partnerships. 
a. The Willing Buyer-WiUing Seller Standard 
As stated earlier, both the estate tax and the gift tax are imposed on 
the fair market value of the transferred property. The regulations de-
fine fair market value as "the price at which the property would 
change hands between a willing buyer and willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts."166 Both the Service and the courts have 
determined that this standard requires that such actors be hypotheti-
cal people rather than the actual transferor and transferee.167 The 
courts have reasoned that the estate and gift taxes are excise taxes on 
the transfer of property and that the property should be valued as it is 
and so it cannot be assumed that a family will always act as a unit in matters 
regarding the property. 
Id. at 1308. 
164 Rev. Rui. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, 203. 
165 See Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 158 (1921); William O. 
Douglas, Stare Decisis (1949); Malcolm P. Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudica· 
tion-A Study of Modified and Overruled Decisions, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1933); David 
Stoffer, The Work of the Judicial System: 1953-54, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 1, 1·4 (1954). 
166 Reg. § 20.2031-1(b). 
167 See, e.g., Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1965); Rev. Rui. 77-287,1977·2 C.B. 319. 
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transferred rather than in the hands of the transferor or transferee.168 
Thus, the characteristics of the transferor or transferee are irrelevant. 
The Service appears to have contemplated this approach from a 
very early date. An almost identical willing buyer-willing seller stan-
dard first appeared in the gift tax regulations in 1924169 and in the 
estate tax regulations in 1925.170 The early tax regulations also made 
it clear that the identity of the legatee has no impact on the calculation 
of the estate tax. The 1919 version of the estate tax regulation stated: 
"[T]he relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent has no bearing 
upon the question of liability or the extent thereof."171 
The notion that the identity of the transferee is irrelevant is some-
what circuitous in application. In defining fair market value, the regu-
lations refer to the willing buyer and seller "having reasonable 
knowledge of relevant facts." A willing buyer certainly would seek to 
ascertain the market for resale and would discover that the property 
may have more value to certain purchasers. Thus, for example, while 
the willing buyer-willing seller test would prohibit the court from valu-
ing a gift or bequest based on the subjective value assigned by the 
transferee to the property, a willing buyer would consider such subjec-
tive value in weighing the amount she would pay for the property 
since she, in turn, could sell it to the transferee for whom it has more 
value.l72 The courts, however, have not addressed this circularity, and 
by ignoring it, are calculating not fair market value, but a somewhat 
lower value. 
b. Boundless Subjective Inquiries 
The reluctance of the courts to consider the relationship of the 
transferee to other owners or stockholders because it would force the 
courts to engage in "boundless subjective inquiries" is ironic. The en-
tire valuation process is a boundless subjective inquiry: To value an 
asset the court has to make guesses or assumptions about the future. 
These inquiries require speculation about the composition of manage-
ment, the nature of the company's future products and general eco-
nomic conditions.173 
168 See id.; see also Edwards v. Slocum, 264 U.S. 61, 62 (1924). 
169 See Reg. 67, Art 7{l}, T.D. 3648,26 Treas. Dec. lnt Rev. 1166 (1924). 
170 Reg. 68, Art 13{l}, T.D. 3683, 27 Treas. Dec. lnt Rev. 95 (1925). 
171 Reg. 37, Art. I, T.D. 2910, 21 Treas. Dec. Int Rev. 753 (l919). This statement ap-
pears to have been included to make clear that the new estate tax was not an inheritance 
tax like that which had existed from 1898 through 1902. See generally Randolph E. Paul, 
Federal Estate and Gift Taxation § 1.02 (1942). 
172 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 135-11. 
173 See Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B.237 (discussing criteria to be used in valuing stock 
in closely held company), modified by Rev. Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370. 
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Moreover, the courts already make such inquiries in another area of 
the estate tax. Prior to 1990, courts examined the relationship of de-
cedent stockholders to the other stockholders to determine whether 
agreements among the decedent, the other stockholders and the cor-
poration to purchase the decedent's stock at a fixed price should be 
considered in valuing the decedent's stock.174 The estate tax regula-
tions prior to 1990 stated that the buy-sell agreement should be disre-
garded if it represented "a device to pass the decedent's shares to the 
natural objects of his bounty for less than adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth."175 Although legislation enacted in 
1990 has made it much more difficult for decedents to use buy-sell 
agreements to establish value,176 more recent regulations still require 
the court to determine whether the buy-sell agreement is "a device to 
transfer the property to the natural objects of the transferor's bounty 
for less than full and adequate consideration in money or money's 
worth."177 Thus, it appears that courts already are required to delve 
into interpersonal relationships as part of the federal transfer tax 
scheme. 
In valuing property for estate and gift tax purposes, the courts have 
exhibited an uneven willingness to raise the boundless inquiry objec-
tion. The courts have adopted three distinct approaches. First, 
although the courts have not been willing to consider the relationship 
of a transferee to other owners who are members of the same family, 
the courts have considered the familial relationship of the other own-
ers to one another in order to predict whether they will work together. 
For example, in Estate of Winkler v. Commissioner,178 the Tax Court 
observed that a willing buyer would consider the configuration of 
stock ownership between two different families in valuing a dece-
dent's 10% block of stock. The 10% block would have additional 
value, the court stated, because it, in effect, would represent the tie-
breaking vote if disputes arose between the two families. In assuming 
that the members of each family would work together to vote the 
shares as a family block, the court was not dissuaded by the inquiry 
that an analysis of this assumption would require. Similarly, in Moore 
174 In Commissioner v. Beusel, 100 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1938), the court held that a buy-sell 
agreement affected the value of decendent's stock because it determined that decedent was 
not on friendly terms with his son and had agreed to the terms only after "protracted 
contentions and negotiations." Id. at 640. 
175 Reg. § 20.2031-2(h) (1976); see Rev. Rul. 59-60,1959-1 C.B. 237, modified by Rev. 
Rul. 65-193, 1965-2 C.B. 370 (interpreting regulation to require inquiry into whether there 
is bona fide business arrangement). 
176 IRC § 2703(b) (as enacted by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-508, § 11602, 104 Stat. 1388-498). 
171 Reg. § 25.2703-1(b)(1)(ii). 
178 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 373 (1989). 
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v. Commissioner,179 the Tax Court, in rejecting the Service's argument 
that, because there was no majority partner, a minority discount 
should not be allowed, stated, "[W]e believe that a hypothetical buyer 
would realize that the other partners were all related and thus, in ef-
fect, a majority interest."lS0 Again, the court did not raise the bound-
less inquiry objection.1S1 
Second, where there is no familial relationship among the other 
owners and no history of how the other owners have behaved in simi-
lar events, the courts generally have refused to forecast how the other 
owners will relate to one another. Thus, for example, some courts 
have refused to speculate whether stockholdersl82 or partners in-
tended to liquidate the business.l83 Similarly, in Estate of Salsbury v. 
Commissioner,l84 the Tax Court refused to consider whether a major-
ity stockholder could form a coalition with some minority stockhold-
ers in order to obtain approval of a recapitalization that would 
advantage the majority stockholder. The decedent owned 51.8% of 
the voting power in the form of preferred stock with a 6% dividend 
preference. The court refused to include in the control premium the 
amount that the owner could obtain if he were able to negotiate a 
coalition with other stockholders that would provide the requisite 
two-thirds vote needed to recapitalize the corporation by amending 
the certificate of incorporationl85 to increase the amount of dividends 
he was entitled to receive.l86 The court rejected this argument be-
cause "to partially base the value of decedent's shares on the possibil-
ity that the hypothetical purchaser could obtain an uncertain 
179 62 T.e.M (CCH) 1128 (1991). 
180 rd. at 1134. 
181 The Service also has examined the ability of a minority stockholder to form coali-
tions with other stockholders in the context of determining whether redemptions are essen-
tially equivalent to dividends under § 302(b)(1). In Revenue Ruling 85-106, 1985-2 e.B. 
116, the Service ruled that a redemption should be taxable as a dividend in part because 
the redemption did not affect the ability of the stockholder to participate with two other 
stockholders in a coalition that would wield control. See Bloch v. United States, 261 F. 
Supp. 597, 611-12 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 386 F.2d 839 (5th Cir. 1967) (making 
similar determinations); Johnson Trust v. Commissioner, 71 T.e. 941, 947 (1979); see gen-
erally Bernard Wolfman, Federal Income Taxation of Corporate Enterprise 214 (3d ed. 
1990), for an insightful discussion of the role of potential coalition formation in the 
§ 302(b)(1) dividend eqUivalency test. 
182 Estate of Curry v. United States, 706 F.2d 1424, 1431 (7th Cir. 1983); Estate of lung 
v. Commissioner, 101 T.e. 412, 430 (1993). 
183 Estate of Watts v. United States, 823 F.2d 483, 486 (11th Cir. 1987) (ruling that lower 
court should not have considered intent of other partners with respect to liquidation of 
partnership). But see Knott v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 424 (1988) (refusing to 
use liquidation value to value partnership interests where there was no evidence that pan-
ners intended to liquidate partnership). 
184 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441 (1975). 
185 rd. at 1452. 
186 rd. at 1452. 
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participation in earnings would be to engage in mere speculation and 
conj ecture. "187 
Third, where there is a history of regular purchases of stock by 
shareholders unrelated to one another, the courts have exhibited a 
willingness to analyze this pattern of prior behavior as a means of pre-
dicting future conduct. For example, in Luce v. United States,1SS the 
Claims Court disallowed a minority and lack of marketability discount 
on the grounds that there was a ready market for the stock among the 
family members and employees who were already shareholders. The 
court determined that a market existed because of prior purchases by 
the existing stockholders.189 In effect, the court assumed that the pat-
tern of past behavior was strongly predictive of future behavior and, 
therefore, allowed it to forecast behavior without getting into predic-
tions about intent.190 
The court's comfort with the use of the past to predict the future in 
this narrow circumstance suggests a simple limited solution to the 
"boundless inquiry" problem in the broader contexts of owners exer-
cising control together. In order to determine whether a transferee 
and other owners are likely to work together, the courts can restrict 
their examination to the past relationships of the transferee and 
owners. 
c. Congress and Not the Courts Should Adopt Family Attribution 
Rules 
The final rationale that the courts have used to permit minority dis-
counts in the context of family corporations is that Congress, not the 
courts, should impose a family attribution rule. If the court's exami-
nation of the relationship of owners constituted a family attribution 
rule, it undoubtedly would be true that the courts would be acting 
outside the scope of their authority. The courts generally have re-
fused to expand the scope of attribution rules beyond that specifically 
187 Id. The court also quoted the Supreme Court's admonition in Olson v. United States: 
Elements affecting value that depend upon events or combinations of occur-
rences which, while within the realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be 
reasonably probable should be excluded from consideration for that would be 
to allow mere speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the ascertain-
ment of value-a thing to be condemned in business transactions as well as in 
a judicial ascertainment of truth. 
207 U.S. 246, 257 (1934). 
188 84-1 USTC 'l! 13,549 (Ct. CI. 1984); see also Estate of Neff v. Commissioner, 57 
T.C.M. (CCH) 669 (1989) (permitting only 10% discount for lack of marketability because 
company had over period of years been willing to repurchase stock.) 
189 Luce, 84-1 USTC at 84,391-92. 
190 See id. at 84,392. 
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stated in the statute.191 Family attribution rules that create an ir-
rebuttable presumption of singularity of purpose among family mem-
bersl92 or that treat family members as a unit193 are exceptions to the 
Code's general rule treating individuals as separate taxable units. 
Such significant variations should be addressed from the broad per-
spective of the legislature rather than the narrow perspective of a 
court, which generally is limited to considering the facts before it.l94 
A judicial determination that the courts should examine the rela-
tionships of the transferees and other owners would not create an ir-
rebuttable presumption, but rather would merely allow the courts to 
determine whether control will be exercised by the group. As dis-
cussed earlier,195 the courts have been willing to examine the past ac-
tions of stockholders and partners to determine whether a ready 
market for stock or partnership interests exists. Moreover, the courts 
are required to consider the prior relationship and actions of stock-
holders in order to d~termine whether restrictions on the resale of 
stock or partnership interests to third parties should affect the valua-
tion of the stock or partnership interests.196 In order to avoid a 
191 See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 510 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting expansion of 
attribution rules in § 1239); Fort Walton Square, Inc. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 653 (1970) 
(refusing to expand scope of predecessor of § 267{b». But see Barnes v. United States, 
222 F. Supp. 960 (D. Mass. 1963) (seemingly expanding scope of predecessor of § 267{b». 
For an interesting analysis of the Service's attempt to expand the scope of statutory attribu-
tion rules in the income tax, see Glenn E. Coven, The Affinity Provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code: A Case Study in Nonsimplification, 45 Tenn. L. Rev. 557, 634-40 (l978). 
192 Courts have considered whether family attribution rules are always irrebuttable 
where family hostility exists in the context of §§ 267 and 318. The Tax Court has ruled that 
the family attribution rules of § 267 cannot be rebutted by showing hostility among family 
members. Miller v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 182, 190 (l980). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, the 
Tax Court in recent decisions and the Service have concluded that the § 318 attribution 
rules may not be rebutted by a showing of hostility. Metzger Trust v. Commissioner, 693 
F2d 459 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Cerone v. Commissioner, 'Ol 
T.C. 1 (1986) (finding that attribution rules of § 318 were irrebuttable and rejecting earlier 
Tax Court decision that had suggested otherwise); Rev. Rul. 80-26, 1980-1 C.B.66. But see 
Haft Trust v. Commissioner, 510 F2d 43 (1st Cir. 1975) (concluding that § 318 attribution 
rules could be rebutted for purposes of § 302{b)(l) dividend equivalence test). 
193 See, e.g., IRe § l(g) (taxing unearned income of children under age 14 at their par-
ent's top marginal rate), § 151(d)(2) (preventing both parent and child from claiming de-
pendency exemption), § l(a) (generally permitting special tax rates for married individuals 
who file joint return). For a review and critique of various attribution rules, see Coven. 
note 191; Thomas J. Reilly, An Approach to the Simplification and Standardization of the 
Concepts "The Family," "Related Parties," "Control," and "Attribution of Ownership," 15 
Tax L. Rev. 253 (1960); Fred M. Ringel, Stanley S. Surrey & William C. Warren, Attribu-
tion of Stock Ownership in the Internal Revenue Code, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 209 (1958). 
194 See Coven, note 191, at 640 (critiquing judicially created attribution rules). For an 
interesting argument that Congress should not adopt a broad irrebuttable presumption of 
family attribution in the estate and gift tax for purposes of combining O\mership, see Moni-
cal, note 53, at 795. 
195 See text accompanying notes 188-90. 
196 See text accompanying notes 175-77. 
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boundless inquiry, the courts could confine their examination to the 
prior relationship of the owners in establishing a basis for predicting 
future behavior. 
VI. ARGUMENTS AVAILABLE TO THE SERVICE TO CAPTURE 
LOST VALUE 
The Service has employed three other approaches that may accom-
plish roughly the same objective of trying to capture the transferred 
opportunity to participate in control. These approaches apply the 
substance-over-form or step transaction doctrine to combine a series 
of gifts and bequests that have the long-term effect of transferring 
control. The Service also has attempted to capture additional value by 
measuring the "swing vote" attribute of transferred stock. It is likely, 
however, that these approaches have only limited application and are 
not very effective in capturing all the value transferred to family mem-
bers because they easily can be avoided with careful planning. 
A. Substance Over Form 
One method to capture the control premium where a series of gifts 
of minority interests is made to a single donee is to apply the sub-
stance-over-form doctrine. Disregarding an initial transfer permits a 
subsequent transfer to be treated as conveying control. For example, 
in Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner,197 the taxpayer, who suffered 
from lung cancer, transferred 0.88% of the outstanding stock of a 
closely held corporation 18 days before her death to her two children, 
reducing her stock ownership to 49.65%. The taxpayer made the gifts 
after repeated written suggestions by her accountant that she would 
save significant amounts of estate tax if she held less than 50% of the 
company. At her death, she bequeathed the remaining 49.65% to her 
two children.19B 
The Tax Court denied a minority discount for the bequest because, 
in substance, the gifts never occurred. The court noted that, after 
making the gifts, the taxpayer continued to control the corporation 
and to serve as chairman. Finding that the sole purpose of the gift was 
to obtain a minority discount, the court concluded that transfers ef-
fected solely to reduce transfer tax, which have no impact on the 
transferor's beneficial interest, will be disregarded.l99 
197 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990). 
198 Id. at 647-48. 
199 Id. at 659. 
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Murphy should be contrasted with Estate of Lenheim v. Commis-
sioner,2OO in which the decedent gave minority interests in the family 
corporation to his sons three months before his death. The gifts re-
duced the decedent's interest in the corporation from 58% to 20.8%. 
At death, the decedent bequeathed the remaining stock to his sons. 
The Service did not challenge the appropriateness of a minority dis-
count. Factors that account for this failure may include the taxpayer's 
retirement from the business three years prior to his death, the man-
agement of the business by his sons since that time, and the significant 
reduction of the taxpayer's percentage of stock ownership. These 
facts indicate that the gifts were not motivated solely by tax avoidance 
but rather were intended to insure the transfer of ownership of the 
family business to those who already controlled it. 
The paucity of cases applying the substance-over-form doctrine sug-
gests that it is of limited usefulness to the Service in dealing with the 
transfer of an opportunity to participate in control. The paper trail in 
Estate of Murphy of the accountant's repeated suggestions to reduce 
the taxpayer's ownership in the company below 50% in order to re-
duce the estate tax, the gift of an extremely small percentage of stock, 
which suggested that the taxpayer was only transferring enough stock 
to break control, and the retention of her executive positions, made it 
easy for the court to conclude that, in substance, no transfer had oc-
curred. Indeed, the court stated that the taxpayer's retention of con-
trol after the gift may have caused § 2036(a)(1) to apply. Section 
2036(a)(1) includes transferred property in an estate to the e,..1ent the 
decedent has retained the actual possession or enjoyment of the trans-
ferred property. The retention of the right to vote "directly or indi-
rectly" shares of stock of a controlled corporation is retention of the 
enjoyment of transferred property.201 The court, however, declined to 
apply § 2036(a)(1) because the Service failed to raise the issue.202 A 
well-advised taxpayer could easily avoid the substance-over-form ar-
gument by insuring the existence of circumstances that indicate that a 
transfer of control in fact had occurred. For example, after the trans-
fer the donees could call a new board of directors meeting. If they 
want the donor to continue as chairman of the board, they should vote 
to do so and set forth their reasons. At the directors' meeting, they 
also can discuss their future plans for the business and direct the of-
ficers to implement those plans. 
200 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 356 (1990). 
201 IRC § 2036(b)(1). 
202 Estate of Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 665. 
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1. Family Partnerships 
Application of the substance-over-form doctrine to family limited 
partnerships merits special consideration. A donor may use a limited 
partnership to increase the size of a minority discount. For example, if 
a donor transfers an undivided interest in rental real estate, the courts 
normally permit only a 10 to 20% discount to reflect the estimated 
cost the donee would incur in obtaining a partition since an undivided 
interest in real estate gives the owner the right to the use and enjoy-
ment of real estate.203 If, however, the real estate is contributed to a 
limited partnership, the gift of the limited partnership interest should 
qualify for a larger discount because the limited partner's rights in the 
real estate are more circumscribed. A limited partner probably has no 
right to the use and enjoyment of the land unless the partnership 
agreement so provides.204 Moreover, a limited partner normally is re-
stricted from participating in the management of the real estate and 
also normally is not able to withdraw from the partnership and receive 
the value of his interest.2os 
The Service could use either of two arguments to challenge the use 
of a limited partnership. First, the Service could argue that the trans-
fer of real estate to the partnership prior to the gift of the partnership 
interest served no business purpose. Second, the Service could argue 
that the partnership should be ignored because it is not a partnership 
for federal tax purposes. 
The courts ignore an entity's existence when it was not formed for a 
business purpose and has no business activity.206 Similarly, courts ig-
nore the existence of an entity by treating it as a conduit even if it has 
a business purpose or activity, if the entity's role in a particular trans-
action serves no business purpose other than tax avoidance.207 Be-
cause the courts frequently have held that limiting liability is a valid 
business purpose, placing rental real estate into a limited partnership 
prior to giving the interest to a donee in order to shield the donee 
from tort or environmental liabilities should constitute a valid busi-
ness purpose.20B Similarly, placing securities in a limited partnership 
203 See text accompanying notes 73-80. 
204 See Caley Invs. I v. Lowe Family Assoc., Ltd., 754 P.2d 793, 795 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1988); Alan R. Bromberg & Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership 'lI13.04(c)(2) (1996). 
205 See text accompanying notes 86-89. 
206 See, e.g., Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943); Boris 
I. Bittker & James S. Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders 
'l! 1.05[l)[b] (6th ed. 1994). 
2fJ1 See Aiken Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 925 (1971); Rev. RuI. 84-153, 1984·2 
C.B. 383; Rev. RuI. 84-152, 1984-2 C.B. 381. 
208 See, e.g., Bramblett v. Commissioner, 960 F.2d 526, 533 (5th Cir. 1992); Dooley v. 
Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1372, 1376 (1984); Johnson Bronze Co. v. Commissioner, 
24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1542, 1553 (1965); see generally Bruce N. Lemons, Thomas H. Olson & 
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prior to making gifts in order to create a portfolio large enough to 
retain a sophisticated investment advisor and to reduce brokerage 
commissions should constitute a valid business purpose. 
Assuming that a valid business purpose exists for using a limited 
partnership, the courts nevertheless may refuse to respect the partner-
ship for federal tax purposes if it engages in no profit seeking activity. 
Section 7701(a)(2) defines a partnership for purposes of the income, 
estate and gift taxes as an entity "through or by means of which any 
business, financial operation, or venture is carried on .... " For exam-
ple, if a partnership merely holds a personal residence or vacation 
property that is used only by family members who are partners, the 
courts may disregard the partnership.209 A failure to rent it or to plan 
to sell it for gain probably would not satisfy the definitional require-
ment that it carry on "a business, financial operation, or venture. "210 
The extent to which the partnership must engage in profit seeking 
activity to meet this requirement is not clear, however. Occasionally 
renting property in between periods that it is occupied by partners and 
hoping that the property will be sold for a gain in the future clearly 
does not qualify as a "business."211 Because "financial operation" and 
"venture" are not defined in the Code or regulations, uncertainty ex-
ists as to whether occasionally renting the property and holding it for 
appreciation qualifies as a financial operation or venture. The regula-
tions implicitly suggest that a partnership investing in securities is a 
financial operation.212 Analogizing a personal residence partnership 
that only occasionally rents the property and holds it for appreciation 
to a securities partnership may be inappropriate because there is no 
McKay Marsden, Using Foreign Corporations to Avoid U.S. Estate Tax on U.s. Resi-
dences-With a Canadian Emphasis, 52 Tax Notes 947, 948-49 (1991) (describing situa-
tions in which existence of corporation is respected). 
209 The Service adopted this position in § 1.701-2(d) (Ex. 6) of the regulations but subse-
quently revoked the example in Announcement 95-8, 1995-7 I.R.B. 56 (Feb. 13). 
210 See Form Builders, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1415 (1990) (ignoring 
partnership for income tax purposes where there was no sharing of profits); Reg. § 1.761-
l(a) (merely sharing expenses does not create partnership for federal income tax pur-
poses); see also Bruce N. Lemons & Richard D. Blau, Significant Issues May Remain for S 
Corporation Partners Despite IRS's Newest Ruling, 81 J. Tax'n 132, 134 (1994) (arguing 
that partnership will not exist for income tax purposes when there is no joint profit 
motive). 
211 Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987) (stating that to be engaged in a 
trade or business taxpayer must be involved in activity with continuity and regularity and 
primary purpose for activity must be for income or profit); see Michael B. Lang. When a 
House Is Not Entirely a Home: Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code § 280A for 
Home Offices, Vacation Homes, Etc., 1981 Utah L. Rev. 275, 296 n.95 (annotating cases 
that address whether vacation home was used in trade or business). 
212 See Reg. § 1.761-2(a)(2) (allowing the participants in the "joint purchase, retention. 
sale, or exchange of investment property" to elect not to be taxable as a partnership); Reg. 
§ 1.701-2(d) (Ex. 9) (partnership formed to engage in securities investments is bona fide). 
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personal use in the latter whereas personal use would predominate in 
the former.213 It is more plausible that a personal residence partner-
ship might qualify as a "venture" since there has been an undertaking 
with a partial view to eventual profit, but the lack of authority214 is 
troublesome due to the personal use of the partnership. 
In the event that a court determines that the limited partnership 
does not satisfy the requirement of carrying on a business, financial 
operation or venture, it could characterize the "partnership" as 
merely an agreement restricting the limited partner's right to use or 
sell the underlying property.215 The agreement probably would be 
disregarded under § 2703(a) because it would not represent a "bona 
fide business arrangement" within the meaning of § 2703(b )(1).216 A 
determination that no partnership existed because the partnership's 
predominant motive was a personal use of the real estate, in most cir-
cumstances, would preclude a determination that the "agreement was 
a bona fide business arrangement" since the property itself was pri-
213 See IRC § 165(c)(2); Reg. § 1.165-9(a) (denying loss deduction for real estate used as 
personal residence). 
214 Although the courts frequently define the tenn "joint venture" for purposes of deter-
mining whether the joint venture is taxable as a partnership, they do not define the tenn 
"venture." See, e.g., Sierra Club, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.e. 307,322-23 (1994); Torres 
v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702, 736 (1987). Instead, they simply recite that the tenn "part-
nership" includes a "joint venture ... through or by means of which any business, financial 
operation, or venture is carried on." IRC § 761(a). 
215 It is also possible that the court would recharacterize the "partnership" as a trust for 
federal tax purposes. There are several conflicting considerations. Section 301.7701-4(a) 
of the regulations defines a trust as "an arrangement created either by a will or by an inter 
vivos declaration whereby trustees take title to property for the purpose of protecting or 
conserving it for the beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in chancery or probate 
courts." While the "partnership" clearly would be holding the personal residence to pro-
tect it or conserve it, it is not clear that such activity would be under the "rules applied in 
chancery or probate court" since for state law purposes, the partnership would be gov-
erned by the applicable partnership statute. Moreover, there is also some authority that if 
a "trust" instrument confers the authority to conduct a business, the entity will not qualify 
as a trust for tax purposes even if no business activity occurs. Helvering v. Coleman-Gil-
bert Assoc., 296 U.S. 369, 374 (1935); see AJ. Alex Gelinas, Mineral Royalty 'frust 'frans-
actions: The Use of the Grantor Trust to Avoid Corporate Income Tax, 37 Tax Law. 225, 
231 (1982). On the other hand, there is some authority that a trust may exist where a 
responsible person has broad discretionary powers of administration with respect to prop-
erty and is required to conserve that property. See, e.g., Rev. Rut. 69-300, 1969-1 C.B. 167; 
Rev. Rut. 61-102, 1961-1 C.B. 245; William J. Falk, Taxation of Non-Electing Settlement 
Funds Poses Many Questions, 74 J. Tax'n 106 (1991). The extent to which the general 
partner possesses these powers will depend upon the scope of authority conferred by the 
partnership agreement. If a court detennined that the "partnership" was a trust, the trans-
fer of the limited partnership interest could be subject to the special valuation rules of 
§ 2702. Moreover, courts disallow minority discounts for gifts of property in trust. See text 
accompanying note 29. 
216 See IRC § 2703(a), (b)(1); Reg. § 25.2703-1(b) (explaining exceptions). 
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marily held for nonbusiness reasons.217 This means that gifts of the 
limited partnership interests could be valued as mere cotenancies. 
If a court determines that the limited partnership does satisfy the 
requirement of carrying on a "business, financial operation or ven-
ture," § 2703 still may permit the Service to disregard portions of the 
partnership agreement.218 For example, the Service may apply § 2703 
to challenge the validity of a buy-back provision in the agreement. 
Where, however, the limited partnership's existence is respected, 
§ 2703 normally does not permit the Service to disregard the restric-
tion on a limited partner's right to use, manage or sell the partner-
ship's assets. Sections 2703(b)(1) and (3) require such restrictions to 
represent bona fide business arrangements comparable to similar 
transactions entered into by unrelated persons dealing at arm's length. 
Restrictions on the limited partner's right to use, manage or sell the 
partnership's assets serve a valid business purpose because they mini-
mize interference with the business use of the property. Moreover, 
such limitations are probably present in every limited partnership or-
ganized under RULPA unless the partnership agreement provides 
otherwise.219 Consequently, it would be difficult for the Service to ar-
gue that such restrictions do not satisfy the provisions of § 2703(b)(1) 
and (3). 
In addition, it is also unlikely that the limited partnership's restric-
tions on the use or sale of partnership assets would constitute a "de-
vice" to transfer property "for less than full and adequate 
consideration" within the meaning of § 2703(b)(2) so long as the re-
strictions are not broader than necessary to achieve their business 
objectives. Determining whether partnership restrictions on the lim-
ited partner's use, sale or management of partnership property consti-
tuted a device within the meaning of § 2703 (b) (2) is somewhat 
difficult in the context of inter vivos gifts of limited partnership inter-
ests because the legislative history indicates that Congress focused on 
testamentary devices to deflate the value of bequests artificially. The 
Senate report states that the device standard adopts the reasoning of 
St. Louis County Bank v. United States220 that the "mere showing" 
that the agreement is a bona fide business arrangement would not give 
the agreement estate tax effect if other facts indicate that the agree-
ment is a device.221 The court held that although a stock purchase 
217 IRe § 2703 (b) (2); Reg. § 25ol703-1(b)(1)(ii). 
218 See Reg. § 25ol703-1(a)(3) (stating that right or restriction subject to § 2703 may be 
contained in partnership agreement). 
219 See Caley Invs. I v. Lowe Family Assoc., Ltd., 754 P.2d 793, 795 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1988); Bromberg & Ribstein, note 204, § 13.04(c)(2). 
22D 674 Fold 1207 (8th Cir. 1982). 
221 136 Cong. Rec. S15,629, 15,679 (daily ed. Oct 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Sasser). 
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agreement had been adopted for valid business purposes-the main-
tenance of family control-it nevertheless could be disregarded in val-
uing the stock for the estate tax where the facts suggested that the 
agreement was also a testamentary device to minimize estate taxes.222 
The facts indicating a testamentary device to minimize the estate tax 
were the poor health of the decedent at the time the agreement was 
executed, the inadequacy of the consideration provided for in the 
agreement and the failure to enforce the agreement at the decedent's 
death.223 
This legislative history suggests that in applying the device standard 
to inter vivos gifts, the analysis should be whether the restrictions 
were intended to deflate the value of the gifts artificially for purposes 
of the gift tax. In the context of restrictions on the limited partner's 
use, sale or management of partnership property, this analysis should 
ascertain whether the restrictions are narrowly drafted to accomplish 
the desired business objective and are enforced. Where the restric-
tions are broader than necessary to accomplish the business objective 
for imposing such restrictions on limited partners (for example, to 
minimize interference with the business use of the property) or they 
are not enforced, they likely will constitute a device to minimize the 
gift tax. Similarly, where the donor is in poor health at the time the 
property is transferred into the partnership and the donor is the sole 
general partner, the restrictions should be disregarded because the do-
nor's death will cause a dissolution of the partnership224 thereby elimi-
nating the restrictions. In most situations, as long as the donor is in 
good health, it will be relatively easy to comply with these 
requirements. 
Another potential argument available to the Service to challenge a 
gift of a limited partnership interest is to argue that §§ 2036(a) or 
2038(a) will cause the transferred partnership interest to be included 
in the donor's estate. This would occur if the donor's retained control 
of the partnership as a general partner constituted the retention of the 
right to enjoy or designate who could enjoy the transferred inter-
ests.225 This effectively would defeat the benefit of making lifetime 
gifts of the limited partnership interests. In most situations, however, 
§§ 2036(a) and 2038(a) should not apply because the donor's control 
as general partner is subject to fiduciary obligations owed to the lim-
ited partners. If the partnership agreement precludes the general 
partner from altering or terminating the limited partners' interest and 
222 674 F.2d at 1210. 
223 Id. at 1210-11. 
224 RULPA § 801(4). 
22S See IRe §§ 2036(a), 2038(a)(1). 
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from amending the agreement, the fiduciary duties should sufficiently 
constrain the donor's retained control such that it does not constitute 
the retention of enjoyment of the transferred interests.226 
One situation, however, in which § 2036 may require a transferred 
limited partnership interest to be included in the donor's estate is 
where the partnership's assets consist of stock in a "controlled corpo-
ration."227 Section 2036(b) would require the donor to include the 
value of such stock owned by the partnership in her estate where she 
has retained "directly or indirectly" the right to vote such stock. 
Where the donor is a general partner or owns voting stock in a corpo-
rate general partner of the limited partnership, she should be viewed 
as having retained the right to vote "directly or indirectly" the stock 
owned by the partnership.228 The fact that her right to vote may be 
constrained by fiduciary duties is probably irrelevant in the context of 
§ 2036(b) because the legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended § 2036(b) to apply even where the donor's retained control 
might be circumscribed by fiduciary duties.229 
In summary, it will be difficult to apply the substance-over-form 
doctrine to gifts of interests in family partnerships so long as a valid 
business purpose exists for a gift of a partnership interest in lieu of a 
direct gift of the partnership's assets, and so long as the partnership 
engages in a profit seeking activity. In many circumstances, careful 
planning should eliminate the statutory threat of § 2703 to family part-
nerships. Only § 2036(b) in narrow circumstances unequivocally elim-
inates the utility of family partnerships for obtaining minority 
discounts. 
226 See, e.g., Ltr. Rul. 9415007 (Jan. 12, 1994); Ltr. RuJ. 9131006 (Apr. 30, 1991); Ltr. 
Rul. 8611004 (Nov. 15, 1985); see also United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972); Estate 
of Gilman v. Commissioner, 547 Fold 32 (2d Cir. 1976); Estate of Roddenbery v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 781 (1949). 
227 Section 2036(b)(2) defines a "controlled corporation" as a corporation in which the 
donor "at any time after the transfer of the property and during the 3-year period ending 
on the date of the [donor's] death, the [donor] owned (with the application of section 318) 
or had the right (either alone or in conjunction with any person), to vote, stock possessing 
at least 20% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock." 
228 See Rev. Rul. 80-346, 1980-2 c.B. 271 (ruling decedent possessed indirect right to 
vote stock in trust where trustee was required to consult with decedent before voting and 
to vote only with decedent's consent). 
229 See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, at 588-89 (Comm. Print 1976) (stating that § 2036(b) is intended 
to overrule United States v. Byrum, 408 U.S. 125 (1972), in which Court held that stock of 
closely held corporation was not includable in decedent's gross estate despite retention of 
voting power). 
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B. Step Transaction Doctrine 
The courts also have used the step transaction doctrine to combine 
gifts made during a short period of time. While the substance-over-
form doctrine disregards a transfer, the step transaction doctrine com-
bines a series of transfers into one. Thus, where a majority owner has 
made a series of transfers to a single donee, the step transaction ap-
proach combines those transfers in order to deny a minority discount. 
In applying the step transaction doctrine, the courts have not pro-
vided detailed analysis comparable to the step transaction analysis in 
the corporate reorganization area. For example, in Driver v. United 
States,23o the court refused to apply a minority discount where the tax-
payer transferred a majority interest in a closely held corporation to 
her nephew by making two gifts on December 31, 1968 and January 2, 
1969. The court characterized the gifts as "an effort to convert a trans-
fer of a majority interest into one of a minority interest by effecting it 
in two installments two days apart."231 The court cited Gregory v. 
Helvering232 but provided no additional analysis. 
The decision in Driver begs the question of how much time should 
elapse between gifts. The court's failure to articulate a complete ra-
tionale makes it difficult to obtain any useful guidance. In general, the 
courts apply the step transaction doctrine in three forms-the binding 
commitment test, the end result test or the mutual interdependence 
test. The binding commitment test combines two separate events if, at 
the time of the first event, there was a binding commitment to take 
the next step.233 The end result test combines separate steps where it 
appears that the taxpayer intended the separate steps to be compo-
nent parts of a single transaction.234 The mutual interdependence test 
combines steps if the steps are "so interdependent that the legal rela-
230 76-2 USTC 'lI 13,155 (W.D. Wisc. 1976). 
231 Id. at 85,699. 
232 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
233 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 ("[I]f one transaction is to be 
characterized as a 'first step' there must be a binding commitment to take the later steps."); 
Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513, 518 (3d Cir. 1937) (declining to find 80% 
control of corporation because acquiror was obligated to transfer stock representing con-
trol); Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1025, 1032-34 (1976) (holding 
taxpayers did not acquire control of corporation for purposes of § 351 because they were 
obligated to sell 50% of their stock). 
234 See, e.g., King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. CI. 1969) (stating 
that under end result test "purportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated into a 
single transaction when it appears that they were really component parts of a single trans-
action intended from the outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate re-
sult"); Penrod v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 1415, 1429 (1987) ("[T]he step transaction 
doctrine will be invoked if it appears that a series of formally separate steps are really 
prearranged parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to reach the ultimate 
result. "). 
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tions created by one transaction would have been fruitless without 
completion of the series."235 The binding commitment test would not 
apply to Driver because the taxpayer was not obligated to make the 
January 2 transfer. Similarly, it is unlikely that the mutual interdepen-
dence test would apply because the first gift would not have been 
"fruitless" without the second gift. The first gift was a completed gift 
that vested ownership in the donee. Thus, the court in Driver implic-
itly must have applied the end result test, determining that the short 
period of time that elapsed between the two gifts meant that the do-
nor intended the separate gifts to be part of the same transaction. 
The difficulty with applying the end result test to donative transfers, 
however, is that most donors probably intend to make additional gifts 
to donees since the donees are usually natural objects of the donor's 
bounty. Thus, application of the end result test could result in all gifts 
made over a period of years to a single donee being stepped together. 
Analogy to the corporate reorganization area suggests that subse-
quent gifts should be combined with a previous gift only where, at the 
time of the current gift, the taxpayer already had decided to make the 
subsequent gifts and the time between gifts was so short that it was 
unlikely that the subsequent gift was motivated by nontax considera-
tions. In the corporate reorganization area, the Service has ruled that 
the step transaction doctrine will not apply to combine a series of 
steps where each step has independent economic significance and was 
taken for a valid business purpose.236 Independent economic signifi-
cance should exist where the gift has affected the donor's beneficial 
interest.237 Moreover, "business purpose" would exist if the gifts are 
made to provide a smooth transition of management of a family busi-
ness.238 In situations where the purpose of the gift is to effect a 
235 American Bantam Car Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.e. 397, 405 (1948), aff'd per 
curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949), cert denied, 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Redding v. Commis-
sioner, 630 F2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980) (declining to integrate issuance and subsequent 
exercise of stock warrants under step transaction doctrine because issuance of warrants 
had independent economic significance), cert denied, 450 U.S. 913 (1981); Culligan Water 
Conditioning of Tri-Cities, Inc. v. United States, 567 F2d 867, 869 n2 (9th Qr. 1978) (not-
ing that court "should remain free to examine all the facts in order to determine whether 
there exists a plan or agreement to dispose of control regardless of the formalities with 
which the parties may choose to clothe their intentions"). 
236 See Rev. Rul. 79-250, 1979-2 e.B. 156, 157 (respecting independence of (1) creation 
of two controlled subsidiaries to obtain product liability insurance at reasonable rates; (2) 
merger of unrelated target into one subsidiary to obviate leasing of land and facilities; and 
(3) reincorporation of parent corporation in another state to reduce corporate tax); cf. 
Rev. Rul. 83-38, 1983-1 e.B. 77, 77 (integrating steps of a transaction in which an unrelated 
corporation made a tender offer for parent company sock and then acquired subsidiary's 
stock in exchange for parent company stock). 
237 See Estate of Murphy v. Commissioner, 60 T.e.M. (CCH) 645 (1990). 
238 See generally Barton C. Francis & Daniel Hounsell, Accountants Find Success in 
Business Suceession Planning, Prac. Acct, Feb. 1994, at 18 (discussing careful planning for 
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smooth transition, whether sufficient time between gifts has elapsed 
should be measured in terms of the gift's role in effectively transfer-
ring the business from one generation to the next. 
Gifts also may be made where transferring control is not the moti-
vation and, therefore, a valid business purpose does not exist. In these 
circumstances, a comparable standard, "altruistic purpose," should ap-
ply to determine when gifts should be stepped together. The eco-
nomic literature suggests that donors make gifts in order to induce the 
donee to perform services239 in exchange for the gift, to obtain the 
"warm glow" attendant to the act of giving or to enhance the well-
being of progeny.240 The first two motivations indicate that gifts be-
yond a relatively short period of time should not be stepped together 
because it is likely that such gifts are supported by independent altru-
istic purposes; that is, the donor is making a series of gifts in order to 
induce the donee to continue to perform services or to receive the 
warm glow. Moreover, the third motivation, to enhance well being of 
progeny, would suggest that changed financial circumstances of the 
donee would support gifts separated by a relatively short period of 
time. 
The second context in which the step transaction doctrine has been 
used to deny a minority discount is where the actions of the donors 
indicate that they intended to act together to retain control or where 
the donees at the time of the gift already planned to sell control 
jointly. In Blanchard v. United States,241 the court refused to apply a 
minority discount for the donor's gifts of minority interests in a fam-
ily-owned corporation to her children where the family sold all the 
stock to a single buyer less than three weeks later. The court noted 
that the sale was being negotiated at the time the gifts were made.242 
intergenerational transfers of family business). Only one-third of family businesses survive 
into the second generation and only 13% into the third generation. Craig E. Aronoff & 
John L. Ward, Succession: The Final Test of Greatness 1, 1 (1992). 
239 The "services" might include weekly visits, helping in household chores and the like. 
240 The term "altruism" is used broadly here. The economic literature debates whether 
gifts to relatives are motivated primarily for the "warmth" of giving or from the expecta-
tion of some rendition of services by the children in exchange for the gift. See generally 
Joseph G. Altonji, Fumio Hayashi & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Is the Extended Family Altru-
istically Linked?: Direct Tests Using Microdata (NBER Working Paper No. 3046, 1989); 
B. Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Strategic Bequest 
Motive, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1045 (1985) (presenting econometric evidence strongly suggesting 
that "bequests are often used as compensation for services rendered to beneficiaries"); 
Donald Cox, Motives for Private· Income Transfers, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 508 (1987) (casting 
doubt on altruistic model of transfer behavior); Donald Cox & Mark R. Rank, Inter-Vivos 
Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange, 74 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 305 (1992) (finding em-
pirical patterns for intervivos transfers more consistent with exchange than with altruism). 
241 291 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Iowa 1968). 
242 Id. at 352. 
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Similarly, in Estate of McMullen v. Commissioner,243 the Tax Court 
disallowed a minority discount for the decedent's beneficial interest in 
an undivided interest in real estate where the instrument forming the 
trust that held the land directed that the land be sold as a single par-
cel. The court stated that the trust instrument assured that the gifted 
beneficial interest would share in the control premium.244 
Another case in which a minority discount was not permitted is Citi-
zens Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner.245 Four siblings transferred 
their respective shares of a wholly owned family corporation to four 
separate trusts. All the siblings were co-trustees of each trust and the 
siblings' descendants were the beneficiaries.246 The court refused to 
allow a minority discount for each minority block of stock transferred 
to each trust, 247 because it felt that the four siblings had acted together 
to perpetuate control and so should be treated as one person who had 
made a single gift of all the stock of the corporation.248 Perhaps this 
puzzling holding is based on a belief that the identity of the co-trust-
ees in each trust made it likely that all the stock would be sold as part 
of a control block and, therefore, a minority discount was not appro-
priate. As discussed earlier, although the courts frequently have re-
fused to assume that donees would work in concert with other owners 
because of the \villing buyer-\villing seller standard,249 they have con-
sidered whether owners, other than the donee, would work with one 
another.2S0 The court in Citizens Bank implicitly may have deter-
mined that all the co-trustees, who were not donees and who had 
worked together in the past, would continue to work together in the 
future to maximize the value of the trusts. 
In summary, the step transaction doctrine, like the substance-over-
form doctrine, is not an effective tool to combat minority discounts. 
Planners may avoid the step transaction doctrine by providing suffi-
243 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 507 (1988). 
244 Id. at 511; see also Cutbirth v. United States, 76·2 USTC If 13,147 at 85.667 (N.D. 
Tex. 1976) (instructing jury that they could deny minority discount for fractional interest if 
they thought it likely that co-tenants would sell property together); Blackburn v. United 
States, 60·2 USTC 'I 11,964 at 78,537-58 (S.D. Ind. 1960) (disallowing discount for frac· 
tional interest in real property where facts indicated that owners intended to sell all frac· 
tional interests together). 
245 839 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1988). 
246 839 F.2d at 1250. 
247 Id. In Estate of Simpson v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 2938 (1994). the Tax 
Court reached a similar conclusion in deciding that no minority discount should be allowed 
in calculating the value of common stock that a husband and wife had exchanged for pre-
ferred stock in a recapitalization where husband and wife together owned 100% of the 
stock and had acted "in concert." 
248 Id. at 1255. 
249 See Subsection V.B.2 (discussing reluctance of courts to engage in subjective inquir-
ies regarding transferee's relationship to other owners). 
2SO See text accompanying notes 178·81. 
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cient time between transfers and by structuring the gifts in such a way 
that a joint sale of the gifts is not inevitable. 
C. Swing Vote 
A third tool available to the Service to try to capture some of the 
value of an opportunity is "swing vote" valuation. Even though a 
block of stock may not represent majority ownership, it still may have 
disproportionately more value than a smaller block of stock because 
of the possibility of forming coalitions with other shareholders. The 
Service has ruled in a technical advice memorandum that it will con-
sider "swing vote" attributes in valuing stoCk.251 
Valuing the relative bargaining posture of a block of stock is diffi-
cult, however, because the value depends not only on the size of the 
block being valued but also on the distribution of the other shares.252 
To date, only one court has applied the swing vote doctrine.253 In Es-
tate of Winkler v. Commissioner,254 the Tax Court found that swing 
vote value existed where a decedent owned 10% of the stock of a 
closely held corporation, members of one family held 50%, and mem-
bers of another family held 40%. Although the record did not dis-
251 T.A.M. 9436005 (May 26, 1994). 
2S2 Pratt et aI., note 61, at 527, states: 
If one person owns 49 percent of the stock and another owns 51 percent, the 49 
percent holder has little or no control of any kind; however, if two stockhold-
ers own 49 percent each and a third owns 2 percent, the 49 percent stockhold-
ers may be on a par with each other, depending on who owns the other 2 
percent. The 2 percent stockholder may be able to command a considerable 
premium over the pro rata value for that particular block of stock because of 
its swing vote power. 
If each of three stockholders or partners owns a one-third interest, no one 
has complete control, but no one is in a relatively inferior position, unless two 
of the three have close ties with each other, which are not shared by the third. 
Normally, equal individual interests are each worth less than a pro rata portion 
of what the total enterprise would be worth, so that the sum of the values of 
the individual interests is normally less than what the total enterprise could be 
sold for to a single buyer. However, the percentage discount from pro rata 
value for each of such equal interests would not normally be as great as for a 
minority interest that had no control whatsoever. 
Each situation has to be analyzed individually with respect to the degree of 
control, or lack of it, and the implications for the value of the minority interest. 
See also Desmond & Kelley, note 38, at 234 (stating that if minority block would enable 
another minority holder to achieve majority with control, or if minority were needed to 
reach percentage of ownership needed to merge or file consolidated statements, stock 
would have added value). 
253 1\\'0 other cases have briefly discussed the concept. See Estate of Davis v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 341, 345 (1978) (criticizing expert witness for failing to consider 
swing vote value of block of stock); Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 n.9 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (referring to swing vote concept). 
2S4 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 373 (1989). 
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close the configuration of ownership among the families,25s the court 
concluded that a 10% premium should be added to the value of the 
stock that had been determined as though the stock were minority 
stock with no swing vote value.256 The court explained the "swing 
vote" value as follows: 
This 10 percent block of voting stock could become pivotal in 
this closely held corporation, where members of one family 
held 50 percent and members of another family held 40 per-
cent By joining with the ... family [which held 50%], a 
minority shareholder could effect control over the corpora-
tion and by joining the ... family [which held 40%], such a 
minority shareholder could block action.2S7 
There are two defects in the Winkler court's reasoning. FIrst, by 
aggregating the stock ownership of members of each family to create 
two family units, the court engaged in family attribution, which it has 
rejected as too speculative in the context of measuring control. Sec-
ond, the concept of swing value assumes that the owner of the stock 
being valued will be able to form a coalition with other stockholder 
groups. An analysis of the likelihood of such a coalition is also very 
speculative. 
1. Game Theory 
Game theory, a form of analysis that helps to understand how coali-
tions are built, illuminates the problems with the Winkler analysis. To 
illustrate the applicability of game theory, consider a variation of the 
classic prisoner's dilemma hypothetical. Suppose that A and B have 
each been given 50% of the stock of a company. If A and B cooperate 
in selecting a highly skilled management team, their respective blocks 
of stock each will be worth $100.258 If, however, A exploits the corpo-
rate assets for his personal benefit, to the extent permitted by law, 
while B does not engage in exploitive behavior, A's stock will be 
worth $120 while B's stock will be worth $50. If both A and B engage 
in exploitive behavior, each will own stock worth only $50. Thus, the 
possible outcomes are: 
25S Id. at 382. 
256 Id. at 383. 
2S7 Id. at 381. 
258 This example is based on a variation of the prisoner's dilemma described in David M. 
Kreps, Game Theory and Economic Modeling 28-30 (1990). 
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Player B 
Cooperate 
A=$100, B=$100 
A=$120, B=$50 
Exploit 
A=$50, B=$120 
A=$50, B=$50 
Note that each player will have either $100 or $50 if he cooperates, 
or $120 or $50 if he exploits. Under classic game theory, if we assume 
that A and B cannot make credible commitments to each other, A and 
B each will decide to exploit rather than cooperate because the ex-
pected gain is higher. This results in the irony of the Prisoner's Di-
lemma, because, by each electing to engage in exploitative behavior, 
both players end up with only $50. In contrast, had they both elected 
to cooperate, each would have had $100. 
This situation arises when the parties cannot make credible 
promises to each other, or enter into enforceable agreements with one 
another.259 A commonly accepted hypothesis of game theory is that 
the more participants involved in a transaction, the more difficult it 
becomes to create credible commitments.260 Thus, the court in Win-
kler, by aggregating the members of the two families that held the 
40% block and 50% block, increased the probability that either block 
could make a credible commitment to the owner of the 10% block. 
This, of course, also would increase the value of the 10% block. 
Game theory also reveals, however, that to calculate the actual 
swing vote value of a block of stock, the courts will have to analyze 
the shareholders' relationship to one another. The concept of swing 
vote in game theory is captured in an index, either the Shapley-Shubik 
Power Index or the Banzhaf Swing Probability Index. In very general 
terms, the Shapley-Shubik Power Index measures the percentage of 
permutations in which a given shareholder contributes to that permu-
259 See Anatol Rappaport, Prisoner's Dilemma-Recollections and Observations, in 
Rational Man and Irrational Society?: An Introduction and Sourcebook 72, 80-81 (Brian 
Barry & Russell Hardin eds., 1982) (noting that enforceable agreements "would tum the 
non-cooperative game into a cooperative game"); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: 
Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player Game, 78 Geo. LJ. 1495, 1537 (1990) ("[I]f the 
various sides in a complex negotiation over corporate control cannot make credible com-
mitments to each other, the Prisoner's Dilemma may arise."). 
260 See Cristina Bicchieri, Rationality and Coordination 236-37, 247 (1993) (doubting 
whether a norm of cooperation can emerge in a large population where "an individual's 
choice has an insignificant impact on the collective outcome, and defection is likely to go 
undetected"); see also Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups 2, 36 (1968) (stating that the larger the group, the less likely the 
group will act to achieve groups interests). But see John Chamberlin, Provision of Collec-
tive Goods as a Function of Group Size, 68 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 707,715 (1974) (arguing that 
while large groups may perform suboptimally relative to small groups, they in certain cir-
cumstances may still be effective). 
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tation obtaining a majority vote.261 The Banzhaf Swing Probability 
Index measures the proportion of combinations in which a given 
shareholder contributes to that combination obtaining a majority 
vote.262 One of the significant distinctions between the two indices is 
that, since the Shapley-Shubik Index considers permutations of share-
holders, in effect, it considers the order in which shareholders join the 
coalition.263 It measures a shareholder's power based upon the fre-
quency in which the shareholder is able to affect the outcome as the 
last member to join a coalition and to cause that coalition to obtain a 
majority.2M In contrast, the Banzhaf Index disregards ordering and 
simply measures the proportion of combinations of shareholders that 
have a majority in which a particular shareholder participates.26S 
Game theorists recognize that the indices make no contribution in 
measuring the value of a block's swing vote feature unless assump-
tions are made about the costs of forming various coalitions.266 They 
are, however, pessimistic about quantifying the costs. One game theo-
rist has stated: 
These costs depend on the capacity of leading shareholders 
to collude and depend on sociological as well as organiza-
tional factors. They are probably unquantifiable in practice 
even with good quality shareholding data or in a case study. 
However, qualitative statements about them can be made. 
They will be considerably reduced by personal contact which 
allows the perception and pursuit of common interests. Thus 
they will be lower for a coalition which contains members of 
the same family or associated families than for one consisting 
of unrelated individuals.267 
Family members have an advantage in forming coalitions because 
group members are more likely to make credible promises when they 
have a history of dealing with one another and are likely to continue 
261 See Martin Shubik, Game Theory in the Social Sciences: Concepts and Solutions 
202-04 (1982); Dennis Leech, The Relationship Ber.veen Shareholding Concentration and 
Shareholder Voting Power in British Companies: A Study of the Application of Power 
Indices for Simple Games, 34 Mgmt. Sci. 509, 510·12 (1988) [hereinafter Relationship]; 
Dennis Leech, Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm: A Simple·Game. 
Theoretic Approach, 35 J. Indus. Econ. 225, 227-28 (1987) [hereinafter Ownership]. 
262 Shubik, note 261, at 202; Leech. Relationship. note 261. at 510-12; Leech. Ownership. 
note 261, at 228. 
263 Shubik, note 261, at 203-04; Leech, Relationship. note 261. at 511. 
264 See Shubik, note 261, at 203 ("(T]he probability model for the Shapley-Shubik index 
considers all possible orders in which a vote can take place."). 
26S Id. at 202. 
266 Leech, Ownership, note 261. at 231-32. 
267 Id. 
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to do so in the future.268 Repeated contact allows the creation of 
credible commitments because nonexploiters are able to retaliate in 
the future against a person who breaks the commitment.269 Some 
commentators also have asserted that homogeneity in preferences is 
another factor likely to result in a stable coalition.270 Because of 
shared experiences, family members probably are more likely to have 
similar preferences. 
This learning from game theory has an interesting implication for 
the current state of law. It shows that in order to determine a realistic 
swing vote value, the courts must explore two sets of relationships: 
(1) the relationship of a donee or legatee to the other owners and (2) 
the relationship of the other owners to one another. The proscription 
of the willing buyer-willing seller rule that the identity of the trans-
feree cannot be considered means that it will be difficult, if not impos-
sible, to measure swing vote value because the relationship of the 
transferee to the other owners cannot be considered. Thus, after 
closer scrutiny, the courts should reject the legitimacy of swing vote 
value so long as the willing buyer-willing seller rule exists. 
If the courts, however, continue to consider swing vote value, there 
is a distinct possibility that this will result in lower valuations, not 
higher valuations, as the Service hopes. This will occur if the courts 
do not focus on the relationship of the transferee to the other owners 
because of the willing buyer-willing seller rule, but instead focus solely 
on the relationship of the other owners to each other. The focus on 
the relationship of the other owners can cause the court to conclude 
that the other owners will form coalitions. This will further diminish 
the value of the transferee's stock because, rather than merely being 
one of several minority owners with no one exerting control, the 
transferee would be the only minority shareholder with no hope of 
joining a control coalition. 
268 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 126-32 (1984) (noting that implicit 
threats of retaliation may promote cooperation if parties will interact frequently in future); 
Kreps, note 258, at 65-71 (explaining how incentive to protect one's reputation restrains 
exploitation of opponent); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptual-
izing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 899, 
928-31 (1993) (noting that "interpersonal trust" is necessary for party to provide credible 
commitments). 
269 See Kreps, note 268, at 66-70, (explaining that exploited employee may ruin em-
ployer's reputation, requiring employer to pay premium wages to attract new employees); 
O'Connor, note 268, at 927 ("The combination of the fear of retaliation for defecting and 
the prospect of future benefits from cooperating may cause the players to reach a mutually 
beneficial solution."). 
270 See Gabrielle Demange, Intermediate Preference and Stable Coalition Structures, 23 
J. Mathematical Econ. 45, 45-46 (1994) ("[T]hose who are close together either in their 
location or in their revenues or in their tastes form subcoalitions."). 
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One court already has employed such reasoning. In Moore v. Com-
missioner,271 the Service argued that no minority discount should be 
allowed for an interest in a partnership in which several of the other 
partners were related because there was no majority partner. The Tax 
Court stated, "we believe that a hypothetical buyer would realize that 
the other partners were all related and thus, in effect, a majority inter-
est."272 Although the Service's argument that no minority discount 
should be allowed where there are no majority partners is incorrect,213 
the court's willingness to treat the related partners as one control coa-
lition resulted in a discount larger than what otherwise would have 
been available. 
If the courts follow the course set in Moore, there will be an even 
greater schism between the value of a transferred asset to the trans-
feree and the value for estate and gift tax purposes. The courts will 
not consider the value added by virtue of the transferee being able to 
participate in coalitions because of the willing buyer-willing seller 
rule, but, at the same time, the courts will consider the nega~ve effect 
of the other shareholders participating in coalitions against the 
transferee. 
D. Summary 
In summary, the current tools available to the Service to address the 
transfer of control are woefully inadequate. Swing vote value, once 
fully understood by the courts, may actually increase the size of a mi-
nority discount. The substance-over-form and step transaction doc-
trines will help only in limited situations. The failure of these 
remedies is attributable to the willing buyer-willing seller standard. 
Because the standard precludes consideration of the relationship of 
the transferee to the other owners, the Service and the courts cannot 
consider the likelihood that the transferee will be able to enter a con-
trol coalition. 
VIT. A TAX POLICY CRITIQUE OF THE STATUTORY AND 
JUDICIAL RESPONSES 
A. Introduction 
The reluctance of the courts and the legislature to tax the transfer of 
the opportunity to recombine control creates a significant discontinu-
271 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1128, 1134 (1991). 
272 Id. 
273 A minority discount should be pennitted if value has been estimated assuming con-
trol. See text accompanying notes 38-49. The possession of control by someone else 
should not affect the allowance of a discount, but only the size of the discount. 
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ity between the gift and estate taxes. A taxpayer can avoid the inclu-
sion of the control premium in her estate simply by making lifetime 
transfers to the same individuals to whom she would have bequeathed 
the stock. 
The discontinuity suggests that either the opportunity to participate 
in control should be eliminated from the estate tax base where the 
decedent's bequest divides control among several legatees or, con-
versely, that the value of the opportunity should be included in the gift 
tax base where the donor divides control by inter vivos gifts. The gift 
tax base currently does not include the transfer of other types of op-
portunities. For example, it generally is thought that parents may di-
rect business opportunities to children without incurring a gift tax 
liability.274 Similarly, it generally is accepted that providing free ad-
vice and guidance is not subject to a gift tax.275 
The exclusion of transfers of business opportunities or personnel 
services from the gift tax, however, does not necessarily support the 
exclusion of transfers of the opportunity to participate in control from 
the gift tax. Transfers of business opportunities and services are dis-
tinguishable from transfers of control opportunities because the for-
mer normally can occur only as inter vivos gifts, not as bequests by a 
decedent. To the extent that the gift tax exists to serve as a backstop 
to the estate tax, it may make sense to exclude transfers from the gift 
tax base that could not be made in a decedent's will and that may be 
particularly difficult to value.276 For example, transferring to children 
opportunities to conduct business with a third party can occur only 
while the parent is able to persuade the third party to conduct busi-
274 See Paul L. Caron, Taxing Opportunity, 14 Va. Tax Rev. 347, 409-13 (1994); Cooper, 
note 16, at 182-87; Randall J. Gingiss, The Gift of Opportunity, 41 DePaul L. Rev. 395, 
409-10 (1992); Case Hoogendoorn, Transfers of Opportunities-An Opportunity to Avoid 
Transfer Tax?, 71 Taxes 892, 898-99 (1993). 
275 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, 'I 121.3.6; Caron, note 274, at 356, 358-59; Dodge, 
Rethinking, note 117, at 205; Gingiss, note 274, at 402-03. In Commissioner v. Hogle, 165 
F.2d 352, 353-54 (10th Cir. 1947), the court held that services rendered by the settlor of a 
trust to the trust in managing the trust's investments were not taxable gifts. Courts subse-
quently have cited Hogle as holding that the rendition of free services is not subject to the 
gift tax. See, e.g., Crown v. Commissioner, 585 F.2d 234, 236 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978); Estate of 
Childers v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 566, 579-80 (1948); see also Rev. Rut. 70-237, 1970-1 
C.B. 20 (ruling executor's waiver of fee does not result in taxable gift); Rev. Rut. 66-167, 
1966-1 c.B. 13 (ruling trustee's waiver of increase in statutory commission does not result 
in taxable gift). It could be argued that the inter vivos gift of advice should be subject to 
the gift tax to the extent that the gift tax serves as a back stop to the estate tax. For 
example, suppose a parent has an estate of $1,000. He can work and earn $100 after tax 
and bequeath $1,100 to his child, who will then use $100 for business advice. Conversely, 
he can provide the business advice for free himself, and his estate will be taxed on only 
$1,000. Such advice should not be subject to the gift tax, however, because it is difficult to 
value, and would represent too great a governmental intrusion on personal relationships. 
276 See Gingiss, note 274, at 399. 
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ness with the children. It is unlikely that the parent could cause such a 
transfer to occur at death, because the parent's influence probably 
would terminate at death. Similarly, rendering advice or other per-
sonal services to children usually \vill occur only while the parent is 
alive. Because advice must be altered as circumstances change, it 
would be difficult to render valuable advice in a will. In contrast, by 
careful selection of the transferees, it is possible for a person who 
owns a controlling interest in property to create in a will, or through 
inter vivos gifts, circumstances that will make it highly probable that 
transferees of minority interests \vill participate in control. By select-
ing legatees who can work together, the decedent can make it likely 
that the transferees \vill share control even though she will not be 
present to guide them or cajole them. 
Over the past 20 years, several proposals have been offered for in-
cluding the opportunity to participate in control in the gift tax base.277 
These proposals have not been accompanied by a rigorous tax policy 
analysis using the traditional tools of efficiency and equity. These 
tools are controversial unless their underlying assumptions are e""-plic-
itly identified and employed in the analysis. 
B. Efficiency 
Efficiency can have several different meanings depending on the 
context in which it is used.278 For purposes of analyzing whether the 
transfer tax base should include the transfer of the opportunity to par-
ticipate in control, I define efficiency in two ways. FIrst, the alloca-
tiona! inefficiency of the disparate treatment should be considered. 
For purposes of this Article, allocational inefficiency is defined as the 
extent to which individuals alter their economic behavior so as to 
avoid paying tax.279 Second, the administrative costs of including or 
excluding such opportunity from the tax base should be considered. 
217 See Section ill.A. 
278 See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax 
Movement A Typical Male Reaction, 86 Mich. L. Rev 465,483-85 (1987) (defining two 
types of efficiency for purposes of determining impact of progressive tax rates); Edward J. 
McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. Rev. 1267,1292-93 (defining 
effiCiency two different ways for purposes of determining whether concerns of efficiency 
contribute to complexity in the Code); Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: 
The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 980-95 (1986) (describing three 
ways that efficiency can be defined for purposes of analyzing effectiveness of tax 
incentives). 
279 See Treasury Dep't, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 49 (1977); John F. Witte, The 
Politics and Development of the Federal Income Tax 30 (1985); McCaffery, note 278, at 
1293; Zelinsky, note 278, at 980-86. 
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1. Allocational Inefficiency 
The current discontinuity between the gift and estate tax treatment 
may create a significant allocational inefficiency if it encourages tax-
payers to divide ownership of their companies or other assets in order 
to reduce transfer taxes in situations where they otherwise would not 
have done so. This allocational inefficiency would decrease social wel-
fare to the extent the decline in value achieved for gift tax purposes by 
dividing up an asset reflects a real economic decline in value rather 
than a transformation of the value.28o 
In order to determine' whether the discontinuity between the gift 
and estate taxes distorts the behavior of donors, it is first necessary to 
engage in the difficult, if not impossible, task of determining what 
motivates gifts and bequests.281 The economic literature suggests that 
. lifetime gifts are made because the act of giving increases the donor's 
utility by an amount greater than the donor's decline in utility result-
ing from the transfer of wealth to the donee.282 There are several 
sources of the increase in utility that are not related to taxes. They 
may include the expectation that the donee will perform services in 
exchange for the gift283 or the "warm glow" attendant to the act of 
giving284 or enhancing the well being of progeny.285 
Counterbalancing the utility of lifetime gifts are several nontax 
sources of disutility. The disutilities are attributable to the fact that 
the reduction in wealth of the donor may have several negative impli-
cations. First, to the extent the donor expects services in exchange for 
the gift, the donor will have lost some leverage to enforce his expecta-
tion because the gift already has been made.286 Second, the gift will 
have reduced the opportunity to have deployed the gifted assets in 
280 There always should be some diminution of real economic value when ownership is 
divided up among donees because, regardless of the relationship among donees, some 
transactional costs will have to be incurred to recombine control. 
281 For a discussion for the lack of empirical work on the allocational effects of the estate 
and gift tax, see Herbert Kiesling, Taxation and Public Goods: A Welfare-Economic Cri-
tique of Tax Policy Analysis 197 (1992). 
282 See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts 2-3 (NBER Working Paper No. 4868 
(1994) [hereinafter Gifts]. 
283 See, e.g., Altonji et aI., note 240; Bernheim et aI., note 240, at 1046-47; Donald Cox, 
Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95 J. Pol. Econ. 508, 540 (1987); Donald Cox & 
Mark R. Rank, Inter-Vivos Transfers and Intergenerational Exchange, 74 Rev. Econ. & 
Stat. 305, 310 (1992). 
284 see James Andreoni, Privately Provided Public Goods in a Large Economy: The 
Limits of Altruism, 35 J. Pub. Econ. 57, 57 (1988); Kaplow, Gifts, note 282, at 6. 
28S See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 1063, 1074-83 
(1974); Gary S. Becker & Nigel Tomes, Human Capital and the Rise and Fall of Families, 4 
J. Lab. Econ. SI (1986). 
286 See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J. Law & 
Econ. 1, 7 (1988). 
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another manner, such as consumption or generating more wealth.287 
Third, to the extent the lifetime gifts resulted in the donor relinquish-
ing control, the donor will have given up the premium associated with 
control. 
In addition, there are several tax considerations. The current estate 
and gift tax regimes favor inter vivos gifts over bequests. FIrst, annual 
gifts of $10,000 or less by a donor to each donee are excluded from the 
gift tax.288 This means that spouses can make combined gifts of 
$20,000 per donee on a tax-free basis each year. Second, gifts in ex-
cess of $10,000 nevertheless may not be taxable because the unified 
credit has the effect of allowing each donor to make an additional 
$600,000 of gifts during the donor's lifetime on a tax-free basis.289 
Although inter vivos gifts exceeding the $10,000 annual exclusion re-
duce the amount of the $600,000 unified credit that will be available to 
allow bequests to escape estate taxation, inter vivos gifts are prefera-
ble if the gifts are expected to increase in value. For example, a par-
ent could minimize estate and gift tax consequences by making a gift 
of an asset currently worth $600,000 that is expected to be valued at $1 
million by the time of her death. The current gift would be tax-free 
because of the unified credit whereas a bequest of the asset would 
subject $400,000 of the bequest to the estate tax. Third, the gift tax is 
applied only to the amount transferred by gift, exclusive of amounts 
used by the donor to pay the gift tax.290 In contrast, the estate tax 
applies to all property transmitted at death, including property used to 
pay the estate tax. Thus, a donor can transfer more assets through 
inter vivos gifts than by bequests. For example, suppose that an indi-
vidual has $150 and is subject to estate and gift tax rates of 50%.291 If 
she makes a lifetime gift, the donor can transfer $100 to the donee and 
pay the gift tax with the remaining $50. If, instead, she dies holding 
$150, her estate would pay an estate tax of $75, leaving only $75 for 
the donee. Fourth, as discussed above, properly structured inter vivos 
gifts allow donors to avoid paying a transfer tax on the control pre-
mium associated with closely held companies or other assets. 
Somewhat counterbalancing the incentive for inter vivos gifts in the 
estate and gift tax is a disincentive in the income tax. If a donor dies 
holding an asset that has appreciated in value, the asset will obtain a 
W This is the opportunity cost of the gift 
288 IRe § 2503(b). Only a gift of a "present interest" in property qualifies for the 
exclusion. 
2S9 IRe § 201O(a) (granting $192,800 credit against estate tax). 
290 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 120-12. Gift taxes that are paid by a donor for gifts 
made within three years of death are included in the donor's estate, thereby negating this 
advantage. IRe § 2035(c). 
291 This example is from 5 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 120-12. 
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basis step up to its fair market value for federal income tax pur-
poses.292 All appreciation in the asset up to the date of the owner's 
death will escape income taxation forever. In contrast, where an asset 
is transferred as an inter vivos gift, the basis of the asset usually is the 
same in the hands of the donee as it was for the donor.293 Thus, if the 
donee sells the asset during her lifetime, she will be taxed on the ap-
preciation that accrued while the asset was held by the donor. 
Because of these countervailing forces, it is clearly difficult to mea-
sure the allocational effect of the current treatment of minority dis-
counts. While it seems reasonable to assume that, at the margin, the 
ability to avoid transfer taxes on control premiums would encourage 
more lifetime gifts of minority interests than otherwise would occur, it 
is difficult to assess the magnitude of the response. Moreover, it is 
also difficult to determine whether this impact at the margin has 
caused a significant decrease in social welfare. The economic litera-
ture generally supports the notion that companies with concentrated 
ownership perform better than companies with dispersed owner-
ship.294 There is, however, no empirical evidence that companies con-
trolled by a single shareholder perform better than companies 
controlled by a small group of owners. One study that compared a 
sample of corporations in which no shareholder owned more than 
20% of the stock with a sample of corporations in which a single 
stockholder owned a majority of stock found that the mean "account-
ing rate of return"295 for the sample where a shareholder owned a 
majority of stock was 10.2% while only 8.7% for the other groUp.296 
The results lacked statistical significance, however. It is possible, 
therefore, that the only adverse impact of the current status is the 
costs that minority owners will incur in forming a control coalition. 
292 IRC § 1014(a). This step up in basis is thought to be a significant factor in deterring 
older taxpayers from seIling appreciated assets. See Yolanda K. Henderson, Capital Gains 
Rates and Revenues, 1989 New Eng. Econ. Rev. 3, 10 (Jan.-Feb.); Donald W. Kiefer, Lock-
In Effect Within a Simple Model of Corporate Stock Trading, 43 Nat'l Tax J. 75, 84 (1990). 
There are no studies, however, that attempt to quantify the effect of the step up on inter 
vivos gifts. 
293 IRC § 1015(a). 
294 See John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership 
and Corporate Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595, 601-04 (1990); Randall Morek, Andrei Shleifer 
& Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 293, 
294-95 (1987); Karen H. Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value, 23 J. 
Fin. Econ. 3, 4 (1989). 
295 The study defined the "accounting rate of return" as income available for sharehold-
ers divided by the book value of total equity. Clifford O. Holderness & Dennis P. 
Sheehan, The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations, 20 J. Fin. 
Econ. 317, 342 (1988). 
296 Id. at 343. 
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2. Administrative Costs 
The analysis of the administrative costs of including an opportunity 
to participate in control in the gift tax base is comparative. The ad-
ministrative costs of including the opportunity in both the gift and es-
tate tax base are compared to (1) the administrative cost under the 
current regime of only including the opportunity in the estate tax base 
and (2) the administrative cost of not taxing the opportunity at all. 
The analysis considers the inclusion of the opportunity in the estate 
and gift tax bases in two forms. The first automatically assigns a por-
tion of the control premium pro rata to minority interests that are 
transferred by a majority owner where the transferor and family mem-
bers control the entity or assets both before and after the transfer. 
This is a form of irrebuttable presumption analogous to the type cur-
rently used by chapter 14 in narrow circumstances.297 The second 
form is a rebuttable presumption that assigns a portion of the control 
premium but allows the transferee to show that he will not participate 
in control. Table 1 summarizes the results. An irrebuttable presump-
tion that includes the control opportunity in both the estate and gift 
tax bases would result in the lowest administrative costs as compared 
to the current regime. 
Table 1 
Cost Compared to Current Scheme 
Irrebuttable 
Presumption 
Gift Tax Decreased cost 
Estate Tax No change 
Rebuttable 
Presumption 
Increased cost 
Increased cost 
Exclude 
Opportllnity from 
Estate and Gift 
Tax Base 
No change 
Increased cost 
An irrebuttable presumption used to tax the transfer of the oppor-
tunity to participate in control would decrease the cost of administer-
ing the gift tax because it would relieve the courts, the Service and 
taxpayers of the obligation to calculate the amount of the minority 
discount. Instead, they simply would calculate the value of the do-
nor's control block and assign a pro rata portion of that value to the 
portion transferred by the donor. They could omit the additional step 
of then calculating the size of the minority discount. The costs of cal-
culating the estate tax should remain unchanged since this is the pro-
cess that already is used. The estate tax values all the decedent's 
2m See text accompanying notes 122-23, 142-44. 
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interests regardless of the manner in which the interests are divided 
up among legatees or heirs. 
The rebuttable presumption would increase the cost of administer-
ing both the estate and gift taxes as compared to the current regime. 
The courts, Service and taxpayers would be required to explore the 
relationship of the transferee to the other owners and the relationship 
among the other owners in order to determine whether the presump-
tion that the transferee would participate in control can be rebutted. 
Since the courts currently do not examine the relationship of the 
transferee to the other owners, this determination would increase the 
quantity of analysis required for both the estate and gift tax.29B 
Excluding the control opportunity from both the estate and gift tax 
base also would have the effect of increasing costs but not by as much 
as the rebuttable presumption. The costs of calculating the gift tax 
would remain unchanged since the gift tax base currently excludes the 
value of control opportunities. The costs of calculating the estate tax 
for the courts, Service and taxpayers, however, would increase. While 
under the current scheme, there is no need to calculate the minority 
discount for each bequest, under this alternative, they would have to 
calculate the minority discount for each bequest of a minority interest. 
C. Equity 
Equity usually is analyzed from two perspectives: horizontal equity 
and vertical equity. Horizontal equity examines whether similar tax-
payers are treated similarly.299 Vertical equity seeks to insure that an 
"appropriate" distinction is made in the treatment of people who are 
dissimilar.30o Frequently, scholars view horizontal equity and vertical 
equity as asking the same question. Professor Musgrave pointed out 
that "[w]ithout a scheme of vertical equity, the requirement of hori-
zontal equity at best becomes a safeguard against capricious discrimi-
nation [among equals ]-a safeguard which might be provided equally 
well by a requirement that taxes be distributed at random."301 Schol-
ars who view horizontal equity and vertical equity as asking different 
questions disagree about whether horizontal equity and vertical equity 
should be given equal weight. Some have suggested that horizontal 
equity should be given no weight independent of vertical equity be-
298 See text accompanying notes 155-63. 
299 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42 
Nat'l Tax J. 139, 140 (1989) [hereinafter Measures]; Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Eq-
uity Once More, 43 Nat'l Tax J. 113, 113 (1990) [hereinafter Horizontal Equity]. 
300 Kaplow, Measures, note 299, at 140; Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, note 299, at 113. 
301 Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, A Study in Public Economy 
160 (1959) [hereinafter Public Finance]. 
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cause it lacks a normative base and whatever reasons support making 
a distinction among dissimilar taxpayers will require that identical tax-
payers be treated in an identical manner.3Ol Others argue that hori-
zontal equity should be given equal or, perhaps, greater weight 
because most formulations of distributive justice' agree that equals 
should be treated equally.303 In contrast, most forms of distributive 
justice do not agree about the "appropriate" distinction to make 
among unequals.304 
Other scholars have suggested that horizontal equity, to the extent 
it merely asks whether equals are treated equally, and vertical equity, 
to the extent it merely asks whether an appropriate distinction is made 
among unequals, are not useful analytical toOIs.305 Horizontal equity 
used in this manner lacks normative content because its conclusion, 
that similar taxpayers should be treated similarly, is a tautology.306 
Once one determines the criteria to use to ascertain whether two tax-
payers are alike, one knows how they will be treated.307 Thus, the 
principle that similar taxpayers should be treated similarly is useless. 
The useful analytical inquiry is instead what criteria should be used to 
define the tax base.30s Similarly, the fundamental issue for vertical 
equity becomes which view of distributive justice and which economic 
assumptions will motivate the "appropriate" distinction in the treat-
ment of unequals.309 
This Article adopts this latter view that the useful inquiry under 
horizontal equity pertains to the appropriate definition of the tax base 
and under vertical equity relates to the "appropriate" distinction to 
make among unequals. In order to determine the appropriate tax 
base and distinction to make among unequals in designing transfer 
302 Kaplow, Measures, note 299, at 143. 
303 Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, note 299, at 116-17. 
304 Id. 
30S See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A 
New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1905, 1910 (1987); Thomas D. Griffith, 
Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy Anal}'Sis and the Taxation of 
Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 \VIS. L. Rev. 1115, 1155-59; Walter Hettich & Stanley 
Winer, Blueprints and Pathways: The Shifting Foundations of Tax Reform, 38 Nat'l Tax J. 
423, 442-43 (1985). 
306 Paul R. McDaniel & James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The Mus-
graveJKaplow Exchange, 1 Fla. Tax Rev. 607,612-13 (1993). 
3fI1 See Peter Westen. The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 543 (1982); see 
also Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen, 81 Mich 
L. Rev. 575 (1983); Anthony D'Amato, Comment: Is Equality a Totally Empty Idea, 81 
Mich L. Rev. 600 (1983); Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245 
(1983); Kenneth W. Simons, Equality as a Comparative Right. 65 B.U. L. Rev. 387 (1985). 
308 See No~l B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Pref-
erence, 48 Tax. L. Rev. 319, 364-65 (1993); Griffith, note 305, at 1158; McDaniel & Repetti, 
note 306, at 613; Musgrave, Public Finance, note 301, at 161. 
309 See Griffith, note 305, at 1158; McDaniel & Repetti, note 306, at 613. 
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taxes, it is necessary to determine their purpose or purposes. The for-
mulation of the tax base and appropriate distinction among unequals 
should be those that best achieve the objectives of the transfer taxes. 
Policymakers have not agreed about the fundamental objectives of 
transfer taxes. Indeed, many have asserted that they should be re-
pealed.310 I do not consider the repeal of the estate and gift taxes but 
instead assume their continuation and identify their objectives in or-
der to determine whether the tax base should include the transfer of 
the opportunity to participate in control and what distinction should 
be made among unequals. 
The estate and gift tax may seek to achieve four objectives: (1) to 
raise revenues, (2) to increase the progressivity of the income tax, (3) 
to prevent concentrations of wealth in a small segment of society and 
(4) to prevent families from establishing dynasties. Taxes on the 
transfer of wealth at death originally were imposed primarily to pro-
duce revenue during times of crisiS.311 Death taxes were assessed in 
1797 out of concern about deteriorating relations with France,312 in 
1862 to fund the Civil War,313 in 1898 to finance the Spanish American 
War,314 and in 1916 to finance World War pIS Prior to World War I, 
Congress repealed the tax each time the crisis passed.316 After World 
War I, the estate and gift taxes became permanent, although they have 
not contributed significantly to tax revenues. For example, in 1990 the 
estate and gift taxes contributed only 1.12% of total federal govern-
ment receipts.317 
310 See Joel C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All 1ransfer Taxes, 35 Syracuse L. 
Rev. 1215 (1984); John E. Donaldson, The Future of 1ransfer Taxation: Repeal, Restruc· 
turing and Refinement, or Replacement, 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 539 (1993); Charles O. 
Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 Tax Notes 1413 (Sept. 16, 1991); Ed· 
ward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 Yale L.J. 283 
(1994) [hereinafter Uneasy Case]. 
311 Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 Tax L. Rev. 223, 225·27 
(1956). 
312 Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 527, made effective on July I, 1798 by Act of 
Dec. 15, 1797, ch. 1, § 1, 1 Stat. 536; see Eisenstein, note 311, at 225. 
313 Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 119, §§ 94, 111·12, 12 Stat. 432, 475, 483, 485·87; see Eisen· 
stein, note 311, at 225·26. 
314 Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, §§ 29-30, 30 Stat. 448, 464·66, amended by Act of Mar. 
2, 1901, ch. 806, § 11,31 Stat. 938, 948. A form of death tax, in effect, was included in the 
Act of Aug. 15, 1894, ch. 349, § 27,28 Stat. 553 (1894) since that Act taxed gifts and inheri· 
tances as income. The 1894 Act was declared unconstitutional in Pollack v. Farmer's Loan 
& Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), reh'g, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). See Eisenstein, note 311, at 
227 n.22. 
315 Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463 §§ 201, 203 (a)(2), 39 Stat. 75b. 
316 Eisenstein, note 311, at 225·30. 
317 Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 1992: Historical Tables, tbls. 1.1, 1.3, 2.5; see McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 310, at 
301. 
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The estate and gift taxes were continued, in part because the justifi-
cation for the tax began to shift from merely raising revenue to also 
restricting large concentrations of wealth.3IS In 1935, President 
Roosevelt justified proposed changes that would have increased the 
scope of the then existing transfer taxes by stating that large accumu-
lations of wealth "amount to the perpetuation of great and undesir-
able concentration of control in a relatively few individuals over the 
employment and welfare of many, many others."319 Subsequent pro-
ponents of a transfer tax have continued to cite the role of the tax in 
preventing large concentrations of wealth as an important reason for 
its existence.320 
Using transfer taxes to prevent concentrations of wealth has been 
controversial, however. Studies suggest that the percentage of total 
wealth in the United States that is held by the richest 1 % varied very 
little through the 20th century up to 1982 and then increased through 
1992.321 A significant difficulty in determining the usefulness of the 
estate and gift taxes in reducing the concentration of wealth is that it is 
not clear to what extent inherited wealth contributes to the concentra-
tion of wealth. The empirical estimates of wealth transferred from 
generation to generation vary \videly based upon the measurements of 
inherited wealth that they employ. For example, Professor Modigliani 
argues that only 20% of the aggregate of wealth in the United States is 
transferred intergenerationally using a measurement that excludes 
from transferred wealth income earned by a donee on the inherited 
wealth after inheritance and also excludes amounts paid for college 
tuition.322 The remainder is generated by individuals during their life-
times.323 Another model that treats income on inherited wealth as 
itself inherited and treats a parent's payment of college tuition as 
transferred wealth concludes that approximately 78% of a genera-
318 Eisenstein, note 311, at 235-38. 
319 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (June 19,1935). in H.R. Rep. No. 1681. 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935), reprinted in 1939-1 c.B. (pt. 2) 642. 643 [hereinafter 
Roosevelt's Message]. 
320 See, e.g., Federal Estate and Gift Tax: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Wa}'S 
and Means, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1309, 1310 (1976) (statement of Prof. James Smith); Lester 
C. Thurow, Generating Inequality: Mechanisms of Distribution in the U.S. Economy 129-
31, 142-54 (1975); Harry L. Gutman, Refonning Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After 
ERTA, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1183, 1188 (1983). 
321 Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer 
Taxes, 45 Nat'l Tax J. 119, 125-27 (1992); see also Michael J. Graetz., To Praise the Estate 
Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 Yale LJ. 259, 271 (1983); Edward N. Wolff, Changing Inequality of 
Wealth, 82 Am. Econ. Rev. 552, 552 (1992). 
322 Aaron & Munnell, note 321, at 125-27; Graetz., note 321. at 271; Franco Modigliani. 
The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of 
Wealth, 2 J. Econ. Perspectives 15,29-32 (1988); Wolff, note 321. at 352. 
m Modigliani, note 322, at 29. 
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tion's wealth is inherited.324 A third study that treats income on in-
herited wealth as transferred, but excludes college tuition, suggests 
that 52% of wealth is inherited.325 Potentially significant sampling bi-
ases in the data further complicate the analysis.326 
Another objective of the estate and gift tax may be to prevent the 
concentration of wealth in the same families over a number of genera-
tions, in other words, to prevent the establishment of family dynas-
ties.327 Statistics about the concentration of wealth would be 
irrelevant because although wealth would remain concentrated in the 
top 1 % of the population, that 1 % might consist of different families 
at different times. The estate tax therefore may still serve a useful 
purpose by preventing families from establishing dynasties even 
though it has little impact on the aggregate concentration of wealth. 
Concern about preventing the concentration of wealth and, therefore, 
political power in select families parallels the concern that has shaped 
American policy towards financial institutions. Professor Mark Roe 
has argued that the United States historically has sought to prevent 
the concentration of wealth in financial institutions due to a concern 
about the distortive efforts that the power of such institutions might 
have on the democratic process.328 Proponents of replacing the estate 
and gift tax with a consumption tax329 have not focused sufficiently on 
the usefulness of the transfer tax in preventing the disproportionate 
concentration of political power in specific families. Families possess-
ing large amounts of wealth can exercise disproportionate political in-
fluence in a community without engaging in conspicuous consumption 
that would be subject to a consumption tax by virtue of their selection 
of investments and decisions about which factors of production they 
will employ.330 
324 Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of Intergenerational 
'fransfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 706 (1981). 
325 Aaron & Munnell, note 321, at 131. 
326 See F. Thomas Juster & Kathleen A. Kuester, Differences in the Measurement of 
Wealth, Wealth Inequality and Wealth Composition Obtained from Alternative U.S. 
Wealth Surveys, 37 Rev. of Income & Wealth 33 (1991); see generally Kiesling, note 281, at 
197 (lamenting lack of empirical work). 
327 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 Mich L. Rev. 69, 93-96 (1990); 
Michael J. Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate Taxation in Death, Taxes and 
Family Property: Essays and American Assembly Report 56, 65 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. 
ed., 1977); David G. Duff, Taxing Inherited Wealth: A Philosophical Argument, 6 Can. J. 
L. & Juris. 3, 25 (1993). 
328 Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 
10, 31-45 (1991). 
329 See McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 310. 
330 See Roosevelt's Message, note 319, at 643 (stating that accumulations of wealth re-
sult in "concentration of control in relatively few individuals). 
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Fmally, although an objective of transfer taxes may be to increase 
the progressivity of the income tax,331 the extent of their contribution 
is not clear. The contribution of the estate and gift tax to progressivity 
of the income tax is measured by comparing the amounts of estate and 
gift tax paid by high income individuals to the amount of income taxes 
paid by high income individuals that is in excess of the amounts that 
the individual would have paid using the average tax rate for all indi-
viduals.332 For example, Professor Michael Graetz calculated that in 
1970, high income individuals paid $12.5 billion of income tax in ex-
cess of what they would have paid using the average tax rate for all 
individuals.333 He also determined that high income individuals paid a 
total of $3.7 billion in estate and gift taxes in 1970.334 Thus, he con-
cluded that in 1970, the estate and gift tax increased the progressivity 
of the income tax by approximately 30%.335 He calculated that in 
1972, the estate and gift tax made a similar contribution to the 
progressivity of the income tax. Professor Harry Gutman, however, 
predicted that after the enactment of the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
of 1981, which significantly reduced the effective rate of the estate and 
gift tax,336 transfer taxes probably would contribute approximately 
only 4% as much to the progressivity of our tax structure as the in-
come tax.337 Moreover, one economist has argued that the estate tax 
may result in a net decline of income and estate tax revenues because 
it motivates taxpayers to enter into transactions, such as charitable 
contributions, that decrease the amount of income taxes collected by 
more than the amount of estate taxes collected.338 If this assertion is 
true, the estate tax would not contribute to the progressivity of the 
income tax. The empirical evidence is weak, however, because of the 
unavailability of sufficient data.339 
331 Graetz, note 321, at 271-72; Gutman, note 320, at 1188·89. 
332 Kotlikoff & Summers, note 324, at 706. 
m Graetz, note 321, at 272. 
334 Id. 
335 That is, $3.7 billion divided by $12.5 billion. Id. 
336 Prior to ERfA, the maximum marginal tax rate was 70% and the unified credit 
amount was only $47,000. IRe §§ 1, 2010(a) (before amendment in 1981). 
337 Gutman, note 320, at 1195. Professor Gutman also points out that his methodology 
probably understates the extent of the transfer tax's contribution to progressivity because, 
as the population increases, the number of estates paying an estate tax in the current year 
is less than the number of estates that will pay in future years. Thus, Professor Gutman 
concludes, "current transfer tax receipts understate the aggregate amounts accrued annu-
ally by the living to discharge future transfer tax liability." Id. at 1196. 
338 B. Douglas Bernheim, Does the Estate Tax Raise Revenue?, in Tax Policy and the 
Economy 113, 135 (Lawrence H. Summers ed., 1987). For a critique of that article, see 
McCaffery, Uneasy Case, note 310, at 302-03. 
339 Bernheim, note 338, at 132 ("I caution against attaching too much importance to any 
particular set of numbers ..•. [A]vailable data simply do not permit precise calculations. H). 
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Viewed in light of the foregoing objectives, the current gift tax base 
is clearly incorrect. The exclusion of the opportunity to participate in 
control from the gift tax base is inappropriate because it conflicts with 
the underlying policy objectives of the transfer taxes. The exclusion is 
inconsistent with preventing the establishment of dynasties and the 
concentration of wealth in a small percentage of the popUlation be-
cause it provides a method for transferring more wealth. Moreover, 
the current treatment is inconsistent with raising revenues and in-
creasing the progressivity of the individual income tax unless an in-
crease in the effective gift tax rate would have the effect of reducing 
estate and gift or income tax revenues. An increase in the effective 
gift tax rate could reduce estate and gift tax revenue if the revenue 
loss arising from the substitution of leisure for wealth-generating ac-
tivities by wealthy taxpayers was greater than the revenue gain from 
the increased effective tax on gifts. There is, however, no strong em-
pirical evidence that this, in fact, would occur.340 It is also possible 
that an increase in the effective gift tax rate could reduce income tax 
revenues and progressivity because it would cause a reduction in in-
come tax revenues greater than the increase in estate and gift tax rev-
enues.341 Again, however, there is no strong empirical evidence for 
this possibility.342 
The current scheme of excluding the opportunity to participate in 
control from the gift tax base also fails to make an appropriate distinc-
tion among unequals. The objectives discussed above would be 
achieved best where those transferring larger amounts of wealth paid 
disproportionately larger amounts of wealth transfer taxes than those 
transferring smaller amounts of wealth. The ability to minimize the 
estate tax by making inter vivos transfers allows taxpayers with large 
estates and access to the best advisors to reduce their tax liabilities 
and thereby avoid paying a higher percentage of their wealth in trans-
fer taxes compared to taxpayers with smaller amounts of wealth. 
Thus, under the current rule, taxpayers with the largest amount of 
340 It is likely that a significant amount of inter vivos gifts are motivated by the fact that 
the effective tax rate on gifts is lower than the effective tax rate on bequests. See McCaf-
fery, Uneasy Case, note 310, at 316-18. I am not aware of studies that quantify the elastic-
ity of taxpayers' responses to increased gift taxes by substituting leisure for wealth-
generating activities. See Thomas A. Robinson, The Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes-A 
Requiem? 1 Am. J. Tax Pol. 25, 29 (1982) (noting lack of studies). Calculation of this 
elasticity would be necessary to determine the revenue loss from an increase in the gift tax 
rate. If taxpayers merely decrease inter vivos gifts in response to an increase in the gift tax, 
but continue to generate wealth at the same rate as before, the decrease in gift tax reve-
nues will be offset by the increase in estate tax revenues. 
341 See Bernheim, note 338. 
342 See note 339. 
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wealth are more likely to establish family dynasties, preserve larger 
amounts of wealth and reduce the progressivity of the taxes. 
The alternative exclusion of the control opportunity from both the 
estate and gift tax bases similarly would be inconsistent \vith transfer 
tax objectives. Elimination of the control opportunity would conflict 
with preventing dynasties or concentration of wealth in a small per-
centage of the population since it would allow individuals to transfer 
more wealth. Also, elimination would be inconsistent with raising 
revenues and increasing progressivity unless it would result in wealthy 
taxpayers generating disproportionately greater wealth by substituting 
wealth generating activities for leisure or would result in an increase 
in income tax revenues by causing taxpayers to decrease charitable 
contributions. There is no strong evidence that such a substitution or 
revenue effect would occur.343 
In summary, including the control opportunity in the gift tax as well 
as the estate tax base is the best alternative for achieving the objec-
tives of the transfer taxes. Expanding the gift tax base would help 
prevent the creation of dynasties and concentrations of wealth since it 
would increase the transferor's gift tax liability. Moreover, eXl'ansion 
of the gift tax base should increase revenues and contribute to 
progressivity, although the lack of data creates some uncertainty. 
D. Recommendations 
Although the objectives underlying the transfer taxes are more 
likely to be achieved if the transfer of an opportunity to participate in 
control is included in the gift tax base using either a rebuttable or 
irrebuttable presumption, the latter is a better choice. An irrebuttable 
presumption that denied minority discounts for estate and gift tax val-
uation where control of an asset has been divided among related indi-
viduals would improve administrative efficiency, as compared to the 
current treatment. In contrast, a rebuttable presumption would de-
crease administrative efficiency, as compared to the current treatment. 
Weighing against the administrative efficiency of the irrebuttable pre-
sumption is the possibility that the irrebuttable presumption occasion-
ally would be overinclusive since it would not distinguish situations 
where the transfer of control was not likely due to, for example, hos-
tility among owners. Given that a donor is not likely to destroy value 
by dividing up control of an asset among donees who cannot work 
together, the instances in which the irrebuttable presumption would 
be overinclusive are probably minimal. Moreover, this overinclusivity 
also may be offset partially by cases where it is underinclusive, in 
343 See text accompanying notes 338·42. 
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other words, where an asset is divided among nonfamily members 
who will cooperate. Therefore, the administrative efficiencies created 
by an irrebuttable presumption should outweigh any harm caused by 
its overinclusiveness. 
Some may be concerned that enacting an irrebuttable presumption 
would hinder the efforts of families to retain small businesses. Such a 
concern would be addressed better by directly providing transfer tax 
exemptions for the transfer of small businesses to family members, 
rather than by continuing the present irrational policy towards minor-
ity discounts. An exemption would allow families to determine who 
will control the business based upon sound management principles, 
not estate and gift tax considerations. 
VIII. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TAXING THE TRANSFER OF AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE IN CONTROL 
This Section analyzes whether the recommended taxation of the 
transfer of an opportunity to participate in control would be constitu-
tional. Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution requires that a "direct" 
tax be apportioned among the states in proportion to their popula-
tions. If a tax on the transfer of an opportunity to participate in con-
trol constituted a "direct" tax, the burden of apportioning the tax 
among the states in proportion to their population would render it 
impractical. Although the precise line that distinguishes a direct tax 
from other taxes is not clear, the Supreme Court consistently has held 
that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of 
a single power over property incidental to ownership is an excise tax, 
not a direct tax.344 Moreover, the Court has held that the gift and 
estate taxes are not direct taxes because they merely impose a tax on 
the transfer of property.345 
Gift taxes on the transfer of an opportunity to participate in control 
similarly could avoid classification as direct taxes if the transfer of 
such an opportunity qualifies as a transfer of "property." In Dickman 
v. Commissioner,346 the Supreme Court interpreted the term "prop-
erty" for purposes of the gift tax to include the economic value of an 
interest-free loan. The Court explained that the transfer of a right to 
use property, such as cash, without paying any consideration for such 
use, is tantamount to the transfer of a property interest.347 By anal-
344 See, e.g., Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 127 (1929); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 
U.S. 41, 78 (1900). 
34S Bromley, 280 U.S. at 127 (gift tax); N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,348-49 
(1921) (estate tax). 
346 465 U.S. 330 (1984). 
347 Id. at 336-37. 
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ogy, the transfer of the opportunity to participate in exercising control 
of the underlying transferred property interest also should be viewed 
as tantamount to a transferred property interest since it is merely a 
component of the value of the transferred interest. 
The fact that the transferee only has the opportunity, not the right, 
to participate in control should not defeat the concept that property 
has been transferred. The Eleventh Circuit has held that a legally un-
enforceable letter of intent obtained by a developer to finance the 
construction of a hotel qualified as "property" for federal income tax 
purposes.34S The court analogized the unenforceable letter of intent 
to goodwill, which, it noted, consistently has been treated by the 
courts as property for federal income tax purposes.349 Goodwill fre-
quently derives from the relationship that a business has with its cus-
tomers, not a binding right to deal with customers. Similarly, the 
opportunity to participate in control is dependent upon the relation-
ship that the transferee has with other owners. Like goodwill, the op-
portunity to participate in control also should qualify as property. 
Moreover, even if the transfer of the opportunity did not qualify as 
a transfer of property, it is unlikely that extending the gift and estate 
taxes to an opportunity to participate in control would constitute a 
direct tax. The transfer of property is not the only analytical frame-
work for avoiding classification as a direct tax.3SO In Tyler v. United 
States351, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the inclusion 
in a decedent's gross estate of all the property held jointly by the dece-
dent with his spouse as tenants by the entirety caused the estate tax to 
be a direct tax. The estate argued that the imposition of the estate tax 
on all the tenancy would constitute a direct tax because the decedent 
could not transfer all the property at death. The Court held that there 
need not be a transfer of property in order to avoid classification as a 
direct tax, reasoning that an indirect tax is U[a] tax laid upon the hap-
pening of an event."352 The Court further stated: 
The question here, then, is, not whether there has been, in 
the strict sense of that word, a "transfer" of the property by 
the death of the decedent, or a receipt of it by right of suc-
cession, but whether the death has brought into being or rip-
ened for the survivor, property rights of such character as to 
348 United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043,1053 (11th Qr. 1984). 
349 Id. at 1052. 
350 See 4 Bittker & Lokken, note 12, at 102-06; see generally Charles L.B. Lowndes, The 
Constitutionality of the New Federal Estate Tax Definition of a Transfer Taking Effect at 
Death, 3 Vand L. Rev. 203, 206-08 (1950). 
351 281 U.S. 497, 502 (1930). 
352 Id. 
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make appropriate the imposition of a tax upon that result ... 
to be measured, in whole or in part, by the value of such 
rights.353 
The language of Tyler supports the conclusion that the taxation of 
the transfer of an opportunity does not constitute a direct tax, even if 
the opportunity is not property, because the gift of the minority inter-
est itself has "brought into being" additional value. In effect, includ-
ing the transfer of an opportunity in the tax base would represent a 
method for valuing the property that has been transferred. Thus, val-
uation of a minority interest based upon a rebuttable presumption 
that the transferee will participate in control should pass constitu-
tional muster. In the event that the transfer of the opportunity is of 
minimal value, the transferor could show that it has minimal value to 
reduce the gift or estate tax. 
If an irrebuttable presumption were adopted, however, the trans-
feror would not be able to show that the transferred opportunity has 
minimal value. As a result, the transfer tax occasionally would be 
larger than the actual facts would warrant. This overinclusiveness 
should not be a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment, despite an early Supreme Court decision that suggests other-
wise. In Heiner v. Donnan,354 the Supreme Court held that an estate 
tax provision that created an irrebuttable presumption that gifts made 
within two years of the donor's death were in contemplation of death 
violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The Court 
stated that "a statute which imposes a tax upon an assumption of fact 
which the taxpayer is forbidden to controvert, is so arbitrary and un-
reasonable that it cannot stand .... "355 
It is likely that Heiner v. Donnan is no longer valid law.356 The 
Supreme Court decided Heiner prior to the Court's post-Lochner357 
353 Id. at 503; see also Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340; 356-57 (1945), stating: "It is 
enough that death brings about changes in the legal and economic relationships to the 
property taxed ... " 
354 285 U.S. 312 (1932); see also Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926) (holding 
that Wisconsin statute that created irrebuttable presumption that gifts made within six 
years of donor's death were in contemplation of death violated fourteenth amendment). 
355 Heiner, 285 U.S. at 325. 
356 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-32 n.25 (1978) (stating that 
holding of Heiner v. Donnan is "plainly not good law today .... "); see Estate of Ekins v. 
Commissioner, 797 F.2d 481, 486 (7th Cir 1986) (stating that it is "questionable whether 
'irrebuttable presumption' doctrine has any continued vitality"); W. Leslie Peat, The Con-
stitutionality of New Section 2035: Is There Any Room for Doubt, 33 Tax L. Rev. 287. 
301-03 (1977-78) (arguing that provision of § 2035(a) that gifts within three years of death 
automatically are included in donor's estate is constitutional); see also Sunshine Anthracite 
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (Congress may use power to tax to accomplish 
other permissible goals in addition to raising revenue.) 
357 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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rejection of substantive due process in areas not involving constitu-
tionally protected liberties. In Weinberger v. Salfi3S8 the Supreme 
Court held that an irrebuttable presumption pertaining to the eligibil-
ity of a person for social security payments did not violate the due 
process clause because the presumption bore a rational relationship to 
a legitimate legislative purpose, the avoidance of the expense involved 
in engaging in individual factual determinations.3s9 Because the crea-
tion of an irrebuttable presumption about the transfer of an opportu-
nity to participate in control would bear a rational relationship to a 
legitimate legislative purpose-the elimination of difficult factual de-
terminations of interpersonal relationships, the irrebuttable presump-
tion should not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment 
under current law.360 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that the current disparate treatment of mi-
nority discounts by the estate and gift taxes does not make sense from 
a tax policy perspective. It also has shown that the analytical tools, 
such as swing vote value, the substance over form doctrine and the 
step transaction doctrine, currently available to the Service to deal 
with practices exploiting the discontinuity, are ineffective. Conse-
quently, I suggest that Congress should end the discontinuity. 
Congress could deal with the problem in two alternative ways. 
FIrst, Congress could create a rebuttable presumption that when a 
person who has owned a controlling interest in an asset transfers part 
of the asset to a donee or legatee, a pro rata portion of the control 
premium associated with the controlling interest also is transferred. 
The presumption could be rebutted by shO\ving that the transferee will 
not participate in control. Alternatively, the Code could assign a por-
tion of the control premium automatically to each transfer where the 
transferor and family members control the entity or asset both before 
and after the transfer. This is similar to the approach currently 
adopted by chapter 14 in narrow circumstances. In effect, this alterna-
tive would create an irrebuttable presumption that each transfer in-
eludes value attributable to control. Under this alternative, the 
transferee would not be permitted to reduce the value of the trans-
358 422 u.S. 749 (1975). 
359 Id. at 777. 
360 See Estate of Ekins, 797 F.2d at 486; see also John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda & 
J. Nelson Young, Constitutional Law 351 (3d ed. 1986) (stating "If a law regulating all 
persons involves only matters of economics or social welfare, a court should defer to the 
legislature and uphold the law so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate interest of 
government. H). 
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ferred interest by showing that he or she could not participate in 
control. 
Both alternatives would be constitutional. An irrebuttable pre-
sumption, however, would be easier to administer than a rebuttable 
presumption, but also would have greater potential for being over-
inclusive than a rebuttable presumption. Given that most rational do-
nors would not destroy value by dividing up control among hostile 
donees who cannot work together, it seems likely that the harm aris-
ing from the over-inclusiveness of an irrebuttable presumption is mini-
mal. Consequently, this Article recommends that Congress adopt an 
irrebuttable presumption that a transferor who has had a controlling 
interest in an asset transfers part of the value of the control with each 
gift or bequest. Any political concern that such a provision would im-
pair the ability of families to retain small business should be addressed 
directly by providing exemptions. Such an exemption would allow 
families to determine who will control the business based upon sound 
management considerations, not estate and gift tax considerations. 
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